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       The objective of this thesis is to prototype and evaluates the BGP-based solutions that 
are proposed and analyzed using simulations by Alrefai in [8]. We consider a scenario 
where a concerned region is intentionally isolated from accessing the Internet by its 
primary International Internet Service Provider (IISP) which still adervtises reachability to 
the concerned region. Assuming that connectivity to a secondary IISP is available, we 
prototype and evaluate BGP-based solutions capable of influencing incoming and 
outgoing traffic to go through the secondary IISP. The prototyping and evaluation of these 
solutions are performed for two laboratory scenarios: identical and the non-identical 
scenarios. The work also identifies additional BGP-based methods for controling 
incoming and outgoing traffic, and provides a laboratory-based performance evaluation 
for a selected set of the proposed solutions. For the sake of consistency and repeatidness, 
the experimental work is automated through the use of JAVA scripts to detect the Internet 
blockage, launching the specific solution, and collecting the required statistics. Laboratory 
results indicate that convergence time for the tested solutions is on the order of 60 seconds 
and produce minimal effects on traffic delay and application throughput. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
      The Internet is vastly significant that the majority of traditional media services such as 
TV, radio, telephones and newspapers have redesigned themselves in order to be 
compatible with Internet applications.  The Internet has provided new human interaction 
services such as social networking, online shopping, instant messaging and website 
forums. Also, new government, business, academic and banking services have been 
offered through suitable web services. As the number of significant applications provided 
through the Internet increases, so does the dependence on the Internet backbone providing 
resilient services. Local Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are obliged to enhance the 
availability and resilience of the services they provide for their clients.  
The exchange of information over the Internet travels from a source to a destination 
through multiple interconnected networks. Some of these networks are small local 
networks which users are directly connected to and others are large networks that are 
responsible for interconnecting the smaller ones.  Formally speaking, networks are 
divided into several Autonomous Systems (ASes). An AS is a set of connected computer 
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networks under the administration of a single entity that is usually an ISP or a larger 
network called an International Internet Service Provider (IISP). The routing protocol that 
interconnects different ASes with each other is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP 
is mainly used over network and transport layers and makes its routing decisions based on 
the number of hops and/or network policies. 
         Internet connectivity failure, also called isolation, can occur due to many reasons 
which can be categorized into two main categories: intentional and unintentional reasons. 
The unintentional reasons include a router misconfigurations, hardware and software 
failures, and external malicious attacks and security violations on the IISP/BGP 
operations [1][2]. On the other hand, intentional isolation may happen under malicious 
intent or political reasons. The IISP has the ability to block incoming and outgoing 
Internet traffic of one or more ASes. At the same time, the responsible IISP is still 
exchanging reachability messages with the blocked region and advertising the blocked 
region’s prefixes to the Internet.  
The Internet has suffered from many small errors that led to momentous impact 
and widespread damage [3]. On 25 April 1997, a misconfigured router advertised a 
routing update claiming it had the best route to all Internet destinations. This mistake 
disrupted the whole Internet for about 2 hours [4]. In February 2008, a similar mistake 
made by Pakistan Telecom caused a global denial of service to the YouTube website [3]. 
On Aug 18, 2009, EFTel and aaNet, two of the main ISPs in New South Wales, suffered 
from a distributed denial of service attack that caused three weeks of Internet outage for 
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their customers [5]. Moreover, the root DNS servers faced two attempts to melt them 
down, the first attempt in 2002 and the second one in 2007 [6]. 
Internet isolation can be very inconvenient if not disastrous. The harm involved 
may range from the loss of basic communication between end users to the loss of large 
amounts of wealth [7]. In many cases isolation is preventable. This study prototypes and 
evaluates BGP-based solutions that were proposed by Alrefai [8] and proposes several 
BGP-based techniques for combating intentional Internet isolation. The proposed 
techniques are developed, prototyped and tested in a laboratory setting and their 
performance is evaluated in terms of convergence time and effect on Internet applications. 
 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
         This study  focuses on the network configuration depicted in Figure 1 where the 
concerned region, denoted by AS100, is connected to the Internet through the primary 
IISP, defined here as the malicious IISP and denoted by AS300. The concerned region is 
also connected through a secondary IISP, called here the good IISP and specified by 
AS200. As indicated by its definition the primary IISP for intentional reasons blocks the 
incoming and outgoing Internet traffic of the concerned region. Although, the malicious 
IISP isolates the Internet traffic of the concerned region, the malicious IISP’s BGP 
speaker is still exchanging keepalive and BGP messages with the concerned region’s BGP 
speaker and advertising its prefixes on the Internet. However, without these messages 
being exchanged, the concerned region’s BGP speaker will directly route the outgoing 
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traffic through the good IISP and acquire incoming traffic through it as well. The border 
router that carries the traffic between different ASes is called a BGP speaker. 
 
 
FIGURE 1. MALICIOUS IISP BLOCKING THE CONCERNED (CONSIDERED) REGION TRAFFIC 
WHILE STILL EXCHANGING BGP MESSAGES. 
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1.2 THESIS OBJECTIVES 
    The main objectives of this work are to prototype the previous BGP-based solutions 
identified by [8] and also to provide enhancements of these solutions whenever possible. 
The work will characterize the implementation of these solutions in the laboratory through 
a detailed set of experiments. Performance figures for the different types of traffic 
considered and the representative configurations will be collected and compared with 
each other to identify the suitability and scalability of the proposed solutions. Hence, 
these solutions have to overcome the Internet denial by an IISP with minimum changes in 
the network and with accepted assumptions and limitations. Furthermore, the testing 
environment and test cases have to be close to reality in both the configurations and 
parameters. Also, the testing procedures have to be consistent and repeatable. The 
evaluated schemes have to be tested in different scenarios and traffic load. In addition, 
performance figures, such as convergence time, throughput and number of lost packets 
during the blocking are collected for each evaluated scheme. 
 
1.3 ASSUMPTIONS 
• Assuming the concerned region has a dual Internet connection one with primary 
IISP and one with secondary IISP. When blocking is to be enforced, the primary 
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IISP will continue to advertise reachability to the concerned region while dropping 
any traffic destined to or originating from this concerned region. 
• Focusing on available BGP methods and without changing the BGP standards. 
 
1.4 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
 Evaluating and prototyping the BGP-based solutions that were proposed by 
Alrefai [8] in a real laboratory. 
 Enhancing the BGP-based solutions that were proposed by Alrefai [8] and propose 
new BGP-based solutions. 
 Evaluating and prototyping a new set of BGP-based solutions that are proposed in 
this work. 
 Design automated, consistent and repeatable testing procedures, four Java based 
programs created to detect the blocking action of malicious IISPs, deploy the 
prescribed solution and to measure the network convergence time. 
 The evaluation considered three Internet applications, namely HTTP, FTP, and 
VOIP applications and accounted for variable background traffic load 
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1.5 THESIS ORGANIZATION 
      The reminder of the thesis is put in order as follows. Chapter 2 covers background 
information about the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and literature review about BGP 
security: weaknesses and countermeasures. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the BGP-
based solutions, how testing laboratory scenarios are designed and configured, prototype 
specifications and evaluation procedures. The solutions description and validation results 
are discussed in Chapter 4, followed by the solutions discussions and analysis. Finally, the 
performance evaluation results in terms of end-to-end delay, traffic drop and throughput 
are provided. The thesis finally concludes in chapter 5, where we point out the overall 
picture of the proposed and evaluated solutions and the chapter is concluded by a list of 
suggestions and potential enhancements as future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
     The Internet is a collection of heterogeneous interconnected ASes. Each AS contains 
several end-systems (i.e. workstations and servers) and interconnecting systems (i.e. 
switches and routers). Internet services are provided to Internet users through a local ISP. 
Typically, the local ISP is classified as a tier-3 ISP in the Internet hierarchy classification. 
The tier-3 ISPs pay upper ISPs for services and collect fees from their Internet users. Tier-
2 ISPs reside between the local ISPs and tier-1 ISPs and they occupy a wide region of the 
Internet. Unlike the tier-2 ISPs, tier-1 ISPs govern the Internet backbone and they are only 
connected to other tier-1 or large tier-2 ISPs. Tier-1 ISPs and large tier-2 ISPs are usually 
called International ISPs (IISP). A serious Internet outage may happen if one of these 
IISPs experiences a meltdown or is misconfigured. IISPs can also isolate a target region 
from the Internet if they desire to do so [9].  
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     The only protocol for delivering Internet traffic between the different ASes over the 
best path is BGP. The following subsections briefly describe the BGP routing protocol 
and its path selection procedure.     
2.1 BORDER GATEWAY PROTOCOL (BGP) 
     In the literature, network routing protocols are classified into two main classes, which 
are the Internal Gateway Protocol (IGP) and the External Gateway Protocol (EGP). The 
IGP protocols are mostly used under one AS. There are several IGP protocols and the two 
most well known are Routing Information Protocol (RIP) and Open Shortest Path First 
protocol (OSPF). In contrast, there are only a few routing protocols used to route the 
traffic among different interconnected ASes.  The main routing protocol implemented to 
interconnect different ASes is the BGP, which is defined in RFC 4271 [10].  
The BGP is a path vector routing protocols. The BGP learns about network topology 
involves identifying the best path to remote indirectly connected sub-networks, and is 
achieved by receiving and processing the network updates through neighboring routers. 
However, this class of routing protocols usually does not perform any intelligent path 
selection procedure as their implemented procedure is mainly based on the hop count 
which is not considering the link capacity and congestion.  
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2.1.1 BGP ATTRIBUTES [10] 
The following is a list defining and describing important BGP attributes: 
i. Weight is a Cisco proprietary attribute that is not advertised to neighboring 
routers. If the router has more than one route to the same destination in its 
routing table, the outgoing path associated with the highest Weight value will 
be selected. 
ii. The local preference attribute is a general standard value used to prefer an exit 
point among all available exit points in the local AS. Although, the Weight 
attribute is used inside a router, the local preference attribute is disseminated 
to all routers within the same local AS. The path that is associated with the 
highest local preference value will be selected as the exit point. 
iii. The multi-exit discriminator (MED) or metric attribute is advertised to 
external ASes to select the preferred incoming route to the AS which is 
advertising the MED. If there are multiple entry points to the local AS, the 
entry point that is advertising a lower MED will be selected from the external 
AS as the entry point to the local AS. 
iv. The origin attribute denotes how BGP discovered a specific route. The origin 
attribute can have one of the following values: A) IGP: This value is displayed 
when the route was inserted into BGP by configuring the router with the 
network configuration command. B) EGP: The route was discovered through 
the Exterior Border Gateway Protocol (EBGP). C) Incomplete: The origin of 
the route was unidentified or when a route is redistributed into BGP through 
the redistribution command.  
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v. The AS-Path which looks like a hop count; each AS number that has been 
traversed by a route advertisement message is added to an ordered list. 
vi. eBGP multihop [11] method allows indirectly connected ASes to appear as if 
they are directly connected. 
vii. BGP community is a cooperation scheme between ASes that allows them to 
control a BGP path selection procedure of each other. 
2.1.2 BGP PATH SELECTION PROCEDURE [10] 
       On the Internet, packets travel over several routes from a source to a destination. The 
selection of the best route among the existing routes between the source and destination is 
the responsibility of the routing protocol. Each routing protocol has a different procedure 
and criteria for determining route selection. The BGP routing protocol has a unique path 
selection procedure. The BGP path selection procedure begins by comparing the 
associated Weight value of all existing paths and selects the path with the highest Weight 
value. If the Weight values are the same for all existing paths, then the path with the 
highest Local-Preference value is selected. If they are the same, the path that originated 
from the BGP running on this router is selected. If they all originated from the same 
router, the path with the shortest AS-Path length is selected. If they have the same length, 
the path with the lowest Multi_Exit_Disc (MED) value is selected. If they have the same 
MED value, the path that goes over an external AS is preferred over the path that goes 
over an internal AS. If they are the same, the path that goes through the closest IGP 
neighbor is selected. If they are the same, the path that goes through a link that is learned 
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before the other existing paths is selected. If they are the same, the path that goes through 
a next-hop router and has a lowest ID is preferred. 
 
 
 
2.2 BGP SECURITY: WEAKNESSES AND 
COUNTERMEASURES 
 
         BGP was designed to provide reliability with minimum overhead. It is not designed 
with security in mind, which makes it defenseless to imminent routing attacks.  In Hu et 
al. [12] the authors discuss the security weaknesses of BGP which are classified into three 
main categories. First, BGP does not provide message integrity and message origin 
authentication mechanisms and it is vulnerable to a replay attack. Second, BGP does not 
provide a mechanism to verify the legality of the AS-Path or prefix advertisements from 
the AS. Third, BGP does not verify the validity of BGP attributes included in the BGP 
advertisements.  
BGP attacks have been discussed by Nordstrom and Dovrolis in [13], where they 
name four main purposes for these attacks as follows: 1. Blackholing 2. Redirection 3. 
Instability and 4. Supervision. Blackholing is an attack method of dropping all the traffic 
passing through the attacking router. Also, the attacker may drop only traffic that belongs 
to a specific AS. Redirection is a method of redirecting all traffic or a specific user’s 
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traffic to another destination or server for content analysis. Supervision is similar to the 
previous method, but the purpose is to modify the traffic content then forward it to the 
right destination. Instability is an attack method initiated to harm the network with 
destablizing events such as injecting false updates, link oscillations or announcing 
successive advertisement then withdrawals. 
       Several proposed security extensions to BGP are based on cryptographic techniques. 
The most cited BGP security schemes are Secure BGP (S-BGP) [14] and Secure Origin 
BGP (soBGP) [3][15]. S-BGP is based on digital signature and public-key cryptography 
to avoid false routing updates, de-aggregation and update modifications. S-BGP presents 
three security mechanisms to secure regular BGP. First, it presents a Public-Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) to provide the routes validity and prefix authority. Second, it presents 
new transitive attributes to BGP route updates. Finally, it presents IPSec to provide 
message integrity, confidentiality, authenticity and message replay prevention. Ng in [15] 
proposes another scheme called Secure Origin BGP (soBGP) which is based on 
symmetric key cryptography in order to reduce the computational overhead in public-key 
cryptography. Unlike S-BGP, which is based on PKI, soBGP is based on web of trust. 
Whereas, path authentication in S-BGP is dynamic, it is static in soBGP, and called path 
plausibility. Additionally, soBGP adds new security messages between BGP routers and 
no encryption is required for each update messages. A further difference is that S-BGP is 
much heavier than soBGP. As a result authenticated data in soBGP is saved, signed, and 
validated in each router before deployment. 
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2.3 INTERNET RESILIENCE AND MULTIHOMING 
      One of our main concerns in this work is to enhance the Internet resilience of the 
concerned region against malicious IISP blocking. One of the techniques that capable in 
improving the Internet resilience is multihoming. Multihoming is a method of increasing 
network reliability by connecting it with multiple external routes. As explained in Liu and 
Xiao [16], the two main types of Multihoming are BGP Multihoming and NAT 
Multihoming. In A. Akella et al. [17] they measure the capability of multihoming by 
enhancing the reliability and the performance of the network. Also, to get accurate 
measurements they conducted their study on the two well-known types of technologies 
that usually utilize the multihoming technique. The first type is a data provider (i.e. 
website) that provides a service for multiple clients. The second type is an enterprise 
network that receives multiple requests from different customers. The traffic in the data 
provider is usually directed from the provider to the client (i.e. upstream). In contrast, the 
traffic in the enterprise network is usually directed from the customers to the enterprise 
(i.e. downstream). They found that selecting the appropriate set of ISPs has a significant 
effect on the network performance. In Goldenberg et al. [18] they propose that new smart 
routing algorithms have the ability to improve the performance of multihoming and 
minimize costs. 
          The two multihoming techniques improve the Internet connectivity resilience of 
Internet ASes. The Internet resilience area has been covered in many researches [2][19-
22]. In Omer et al. [19] a new method and network model are proposed to measure the 
resilience of the Internet’s infrastructure by identifying the vulnerabilities of global 
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undersea optical fibers. They evaluate the effect of the possible losses in these cables 
against the Internet infrastructure and the recovery from it.  Kim et al. [20] conducted a 
study which proved that modifying the network topology improves its resilience. Cohen et 
al. [21] have shown that the Internet is susceptible to an intentional attack because there 
exists few ASes, e.g. IISPs, which aggregate a large number of the internet connectivity. 
They proved mathematically that the removal of one or more of these ASes causes 
momentous Internet outage.  
       A more realistic study with practical analysis has been conducted by Dolev et al. [2], 
they assume the Internet ASes are connected as a directed graph (policy-based). They 
made their analysis and measurements of the resiliency of the Internet based on that 
assumption. In addition, they concluded that the Internet is highly sensitive to an 
intentional attack and could possibly crumble very fast. In contrast, the Internet is resilient 
to random failure.  A major investigation into the sensitivity of the Internet to random 
faults and attacks were made by Park et al. [22]. They concluded that the Internet is robust 
and is becoming more robust with time against random failures; and the average internet 
diameter is stable even though the number of internet users is increasing. 
2.4 ROUTER MISCONFIGURATION 
        Router misconfiguration is one of the Internet isolation causes [23]. A study by 
Labovitz et al. [24] on Internet routing updates and BGP announcements claims 95% of 
the updates arise from false origins. They found that one of the main causes of Internet 
routing false updates are router misconfigurations. Mahajan et al. [25] conducted a 
comprehensive study on BGP misconfiguration. Their study covered causes, impact and 
  
16 
avoidance of misconfiguration. They obtained their results from analyzing BGP 
advertisements for 21 days from 23 different vantage points over the Internet backbone. 
Although, there are several kinds of misconfiguration, they focus only on two main types: 
Origin misconfiguration and Export misconfiguration. Origin misconfiguration is the 
unintentional adding of an incorrect route or a route with incorrect information to the 
global BGP routing table. The causes of Origin misconfiguration are: incorrect filters; 
advertising the not to be advertised prefixes; incorrect summarization, which causes 
inaccurate more specific prefixes to be advertised, or prefix hijacking; and originating 
other ASes prefixes. Export misconfiguration is the unintentional advertising of route 
advertisements that should not be advertised. An example of this is the stub-AS 
advertising the incoming routing updates from neighboring AS to another neighboring AS 
[25]. The causes of Export misconfiguration are incorrect filter and route-map, typo, old 
configuration and filters, and many others. They found that 75% of daily new route 
advertisements are caused by BGP misconfiguration. Also, 1% of the prefixes in the 
global BGP routing table suffer from daily misconfiguration. Moreover, misconfiguration 
introduces a significant load on Internet routers; it occupies 10% of the overall update 
load. However, they found that the Internet’s connectivity is resilient to BGP 
misconfiguration.  
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CHAPTER 3  
PROTOTYPE DESIGN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
3.1 TESTING LABORATORY SCENARIOS 
      The prototyping and evaluating of the BGP-based solutions are performed in a real 
laboratory designed with different scenarios capturing the real Internet’s ASes 
connectivity layout. The AS-Path length from a local AS to a remote AS through two 
different IISPs is not always identical. Based on this fact, the evaluated solutions are 
examined in two dissimilar laboratory scenarios. The first scenario, called here identical 
scenario is shown in Figure 2.  In identical scenario the AS-Path length from the local side 
(AS100) to the Internet side (AS600) over the two IISPs are the same. The second 
scenario, called non-identical scenario is shown in Figure 3. In non-identical scenario the 
AS-Path from the local side to the Internet side through the good IISP (AS200) is longer 
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than the AS-Path to the Internet same side when it goes through the malicious IISP 
(AS300). In Figure 2 and Figure 3, AS100 represents the concerned region and AS600 
represents the Internet side where three servers are installed with different Internet 
applications: FTP, HTTP and VoIP. Also, the two figures show AS300 as the malicious 
IISP that is blocking the outgoing and incoming traffic of the AS100. However, AS100 is 
multihomed to a secondary IISP, i.e. the good IISP, where the proposed BGP-solutions 
route the outgoing traffic and attract the incoming traffic through it. Table 1 shows the IP 
addresses of the workstation, server and networks in the testing laboratory. Also, Table 2 
shows the network and application parameters. 
TABLE 1. THE IP ADDRESSES OF THE NETWORKS, WORKSTATION AND SEVER IN THE 
LABORATORY 
Description IP address 
Local Side Network 192.0.1.0/24 
Network between R1 and R2 192.0.2.0/30 
Network between R1 and R3 192.0.3.0/30 
Network between R3 and R4 192.0.4.0/30 
Network between R4 and R6 192.0.5.0/30 
Network between R3 and R6 192.0.10.0/30 
Network between R0 and R1 192.0.12.0/30 
Network between R6 and R7 192.0.20.0/30 
Internet Side Network 192.0.21.0/24 
Workstation in the Local Side 192.0.1.6/24 
FTP Sever 192.0.21.6/24 
HTTP Server  192.0.21.5/24 
VoIP Server 192.0.21.4/24 
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FIGURE 2. IDENTICAL LABORATORY SCENARIO 
 
 
FIGURE 3. NON-IDENTICAL LABORATORY SCENARIO 
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TABLE 2. THE NETWORK AND APPLICATIONS PARAMETERS 
FTP File Size 10MByte 
Webpage Size 6MByte 
VoIP Call Duration 120 seconds 
Routers Link Capacity 1.544 Mbps 
Local Side LAN Capacity 100 Mbps 
Internet Side LAN Capacity 100 Mbps 
FTP Server Software FileZilla 
Web Server Software IIS 7.5 
VoIP Traffic Generator Iperf [26] 
Router Operating System Cisco IOS 12.4 
 
3.2 PROPOSED AND EVALUATED BGP-BASED SOLUTIONS 
      In this section the Alrefai and the introduced BGP-based solutions are explained. The 
BGP routing protocol has a unique path selection procedure as we have explained in the 
background section. The BGP protocol offers configuration commands capable of 
controlling the attributes of its path selection procedure, such as AS-Path pre-pending and 
Local-Preference.  
3.2.1 ALREFAI’S BGP-BASED SOLUTIONS 
In this section the BGP-based solutions that are proposed by Alrefai [8] are explained. 
Table 3 shows the classification of the BGP methods on their ability in controlling the 
outgoing traffic or attracting the incoming one. The methods that can influence incoming 
traffic are AS-Path shortening, more specific prefixes, and BGP community, defined as 
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Attracter. Also, the method that can control outgoing traffic is Local Preference, defined 
as Outforwarder. 
TABLE 3. THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE BGP 
METHODS. 
 
                  Ability 
 
BGP Function 
Incoming  
Attracter  
Outgoing   
Outforwarder 
AS-Path 
shortening 
Yes No 
More specific 
prefixes  
Yes No 
BGP community Yes No 
Local Preference  No Yes 
 
1. AS-Path shortening [27] in this method the good IISP originating the concerned 
region’s prefixes using. As a result, the prefixes appear in the Internet as belonging to the 
good IISP and the first AS number in the AS-Path associated with these prefixes is the 
good IISP’s AS number (i.e. here it is AS200). Hence, the concerned region’s prefixes 
that are advertised via the good IISP appear in the Internet with a shorter AS-Path than the 
ones advertised via the malicious IISP. 2. More specific prefixes, the routing table 
algorithm selects the longest prefix match as a network destination to the forwarding 
traffic. Based on this, attracting the traffic through the good IISP can be achieved by 
advertising long prefixes.  However, the accepted length of the prefix on Internet routers 
is limited to a fixed length [28]. 3. BGP community, the BGP protocol has a community 
attribute which is used in the evaluated solutions to influence the incoming traffic going 
through the good IISP. This attribute enables any AS to send a Community request to its 
neighbor ASes. When the neighboring AS gets the Community request it looks at the 
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Community value associated with the request then performs an action based on it. The 
action performed here is assigning a higher Local Preference value to the path where the 
neighbor gets the Community request from. This solution requires the ASes between a 
remote cooperative AS and the concerned region to accept the Community advertisements. 
Table 4 shows part of the Community values that are used by Sprint [29], one of the 
largest IISPs in the world. Any subscriber ISP can influence the BGP path selection 
procedure of Sprint by associating the appropriate Community value with its 
advertisements to Sprint.  
    The BGP-based solutions are a combination of one of the Attracter methods with the 
Outforwarder methods, such as Local Preference + BGP community. Table 5 illustrates 
the evaluated combinations in this work.  
 
 
TABLE 4. THE BGP-BASED SOLUTIONS 
 Local 
Preference 
AS-Path 
shortening 
  
More specific 
prefixes  
  
BGP community   
 
  
23 
 
3.2.2 OUR PROPOSED BGP-BASED SOLUTIONS 
     In this section, the proposed BGP-based solutions are explained. The proposed 
solutions are listed in Table 6. Some of the proposed BGP solution methods can influence 
the incoming traffic to go through the good IISP and others can control the outgoing 
traffic. 
 
TABLE 5. CLASSIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS. 
 
 BGP Solution Methods Incoming   Outgoing   
AS-Path pre-pending Yes  Yes  
eBGP multihop Yes  Yes  
A
tt
ra
ct
er
 
Filter outgoing advertisement Yes  No  
Filter incoming advertisement No  Yes  
IP static/default route No  Yes  
Interface counter reset No  Yes  
MED No  Yes  
O
u
tf
o
rw
a
rd
er
 
Weight No  Yes  
 
         The solutions that can influence incoming traffic are AS-Path Pre-pending, eBGP 
multihop and Filter outgoing advertisement. In this work these solutions are called 
Attracters. 1. AS-Path Pre-pending [8] allows a router to advertise its prefixes with a 
longer AS-Path through one or more neighboring routers. Hence, this method advertises 
the prefixes through the malicious IISP with a longer AS-Path and with a regular AS-Path 
through the good IISP. Consequently, the Internet ASes will prefer the shortest AS-Path 
  
24 
which goes through the good IISP.  2. eBGP multihop [10] command allows indirectly 
connected ASes  to look as if they are directly connected. Consequently, the AS-Path’s 
length between the two configured BGP speakers is one hop which means the 
downstream ASes would prefer that path over all other existing paths that are physically 
short. But, if there is an AS-Path shorter than this one after implementing the eBGP 
multihop command, it is going to be selected by other routers. 3. Filter outgoing 
advertisement method, through this we can control and filter the outgoing BGP routing 
advertisements of the local BGP speaker. This means that we can block the local prefixes 
from being advertised to the malicious IISP and have them only advertised to the good 
IISP. Consequently, the local prefixes are not included in the advertisements of the 
malicious IISP to the Internet, and the Internet routers only learn about the local side 
prefixes through the good IISP. However, the malicious IISP can maliciously hijack the 
local prefixes attracting the incoming traffic and dropping it.  
      The Outforwarders methods that can control the outgoing traffic are Filter incoming 
advertisements, IP default/static, Interface Counter Reset, MED and Weight. 1. Filtering 
incoming advertisements method filters/block the BGP advertisements that coming from 
the malicious IISP to eliminate its influence on the BGP path selection procedure of the 
concerned region’s BGP speaker. This method can be implemented by Access Control 
List (ACL) commands. 2. IP default/static route configuration command can force the 
outgoing Internet traffic to go through the good IISP, even though BGP routing protocol 
prefers the malicious IISP path. The routing table algorithm prefers the path that has a 
lower Administrative Distance (AD) value. The static route has AD value lower than the 
BGP AD value. 3. Interface counter reset works based on the principal that in BGP path 
selection procedure, if all the paths to a single destination are identical in all the compared 
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attributes, the BGP will select the one that has been learned earlier. Through interface 
counter reset, solution the counter of the interface that is connected to a malicious IISP is 
reset resulting in priority being given to the path through the good IISP. 4. Weight and 5. 
MED. The BGP provides particular configuration commands to control the Weight and 
the MED values. The path that configured with the highest Weight value among the 
existed paths would be preferred by BGP routing protocol. In contrast, the path that 
configured with highest MED value among the existed paths would not be preferred by 
BGP routing protocol.  
       As seen in Table 6, some of the solutions have the ability to forward outgoing traffic 
via a good IISP and other solutions have the ability to attract incoming traffic. To 
circumvent malicious IISP blocking we have to combine one solution from the 
Outforwarder list with another solution from the Attracter list. Then, configure the 
concerned region’s BGP speaker with this combination. 
 
3.3 PROTOTYPE SPECIFICATIONS AND MAIN FEATURES 
 
      The BGP-based solutions are evaluated in two laboratory scenarios: identical and non-
identical, as illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The laboratory set up contains seven 
Cisco 2811 routers, four Catalyst 2950 switches, three workstations and three servers. 
Routers in the laboratory are configured to provide the desired connectivity and also to 
implement/execute the blocking at specific time instants. Also, the proposed BGP- based 
solutions are implemented and executed when blocking is detected.  The three servers are 
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set up as they would be on the Internet side and the workstation as it would be on the local 
side. Also, each server is assigned to a specific Internet application: FTP, HTTP or VoIP. 
Furthermore, one of these servers and the workstation are equipped with WireShark [30] 
network analyzer to collect the performance figures (i.e., throughput, end-to-end delay, 
and number of lost packets) of each test. 
      Every solution is tested with the same testing procedure. The testing procedure 
consists of three dissimilar traffic streams (i.e., FTP, HTTP, and VoIP), and each stream is 
examined with three different link capacities: 80%,50% and 25%. Additionally, 
performance figures for the implemented Internet applications are measured and analyzed. 
Performance figures include convergence time, throughput, and end-to-end delay. The 
examined Internet applications would be affected by the convergence time, the time 
between detects the blocking and recovers from it. A check is made on whether or not the 
Internet applications face the same effect in term of throughput, and end-to-end delay. 
The check, also, is made on whether the BGP-based solutions can recover the blocking 
faster than each other or not. This allows for a comparison of these solutions based on the 
effect of convergence time upon the performance figures.  
Four Java network programs are also programmed to automate the testing 
environment. The first and the main software program, called here checker, is capable of 
checking the Internet connectivity and measuring a network convergence time. The 
checker is installed in one of the workstations on the local side (AS100). When it faces a 
sequence of timeout messages, it records the time. Then, it immediately and remotely 
login to the local side (AS100) BGP speaker and configures it with one of the BGP-based 
solutions. The second software configures the malicious IISP (AS300) BGP speaker with 
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the ACL commands to block the outgoing and incoming traffic of the local side (AS100). 
The third and fourth software are designed to erase the previous configurations to conduct 
new testing attempts. These four programs are designed to automate the experiment steps 
and allow a consistent procedure in terms of experiment repeatedness.  
 
3.3.1 MALICIOUS IISP BLOCKING CONFIGURATION 
       When there are multiple paths to the same destination, the BGP routing protocol 
inherently prefers one of them based on its path selection procedure. The remaining paths 
are indicated as backups to be used immediately if the preferred path suddenly goes down. 
In this work the preferred path is always the path that goes through the malicious IISP. 
The malicious IISP maintains the exchanged BGP messages, such as keepalive messages, 
and advertisements with the concerned region’s BGP speaker. At the same time, it blocks 
the rest of the outgoing and incoming data traffic that is sent by or targeted to the 
concerned region. Maintaining the exchange of BGP messages with the concerned 
region’s BGP speaker would prevent it from switching to one of the backup paths (i.e. via 
the good IISP) and will continue sending the concerned region’s traffic via the malicious 
IISP.  
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      We use ACL to permit the exchange of the BGP messages and advertisements 
between the malicious IISP and the concerned region BGP speakers and to deny the rest 
of the traffic. Two ACL statements are implemented in the malicious IISP BGP speaker, 
one for blocking the outgoing traffic and another for blocking the incoming traffic. The 
first one is implemented in the closest interface to the local side, which has 192.0.2.2 as 
an IP address. The second is implemented in the interface that is closest to the Internet 
side, which has 192.0.10.1 as an IP address. Figure 4 shows the ACL commands that were 
applied in the two interfaces of the malicious IISP BGP speaker.  
 
FIGURE 4. MALICIOUS IISP ACL CONFIGURATION COMMANDS 
 
Figure 5.A shows how the local side BGP speaker cannot ping to the FTP server after 
implementing the ACL. Even though the alternative path is available, the local side BGP 
speaker still sends the outgoing traffic via the malicious IISP that is dropping it. Also, in 
Figure 5.A the traceroute result shows the local BGP speaker still preferring the path via 
the malicious IISP (192.0.2.2). After shutting down the main path, the local side can ping 
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the Internet side and the traceroute result shows the packets have gone over the good IISP 
(192.0.3.2) as evident in Figure 7.B.   
 
A. Over malicious IISP path 
C:\Users\marwan>PING 192.0.21.6 
Pinging 192.0.21.6 with 32 bytes of data: 
Reply from 192.0.2.2: Destination net unreachable. 
Reply from 192.0.2.2: Destination net unreachable. 
Reply from 192.0.2.2: Destination net unreachable. 
Reply from 192.0.2.2: Destination net unreachable. 
 
C:\Users\marwan>tracert 192.0.21.6 
 
Tracing route to 192.0.21.6 over a maximum of 30 hops 
 
  1    <1 ms    <1 ms    <1 ms  192.0.1.1 
  2  192.0.2.2  reports: Destination net unreachable.  malicious IISP 
 
Trace complete. 
C:\Users\marwan> 
 
B. Over alternate path after shutting down the main path 
 
C:\Users\marwan>ping 192.0.21.6  Server in AS 600 
Pinging 192.0.21.6 with 32 bytes of data: 
Reply from 192.0.21.6: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
Reply from 192.0.21.6: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
Reply from 192.0.21.6: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
Reply from 192.0.21.6: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
 
C:\Users\marwan>TRACERT 192.0.21.6 
Tracing route to ALIEN-PC [192.0.21.6] 
over a maximum of 30 hops: 
  1    <1 ms    <1 ms    <1 ms  192.0.1.1 
  2     6 ms     5 ms     5 ms  192.0.7.1  
  3    13 ms    13 ms    13 ms  192.0.3.2  Good IISP  
  4    21 ms    21 ms    21 ms  192.0.4.2 
  5    26 ms    26 ms    27 ms  192.0.5.1 
  6    34 ms    34 ms    34 ms  192.0.20.2 
  7    40 ms    39 ms    39 ms  ALIEN-PC [192.0.21.6] 
Trace complete.  
FIGURE 5. PING AND TRACE ROUTE RESULTS FROM LOCAL TO INTERNET SIDE. 
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3.3.2 INTERNET APPLICATION TESTING PROCEDURE 
     The Internet applications testing procedure is divided into multiple configurations. In 
each configuration one of the BGP-based solutions is tested with one of the following 
Internet applications: FTP, HTTP or VoIP under one of the following background traffic 
load: 80%, 50% or 25%. During testing of the configurations, a network analyzer, 
Wireshark, is used to collect the required performance figures. Each configuration is 
tested with the following steps: 
1. Configures the link between R6 and R7 with the one of the background traffic 
load.  
2. Run Wireshark and checker programs. 
3. Run one of the Internet applications’ clients, such as FTP client, to communicate 
with the compatible server. 
4. At a specified time instance a program connects to the malicious IISP router and 
configures it with the blocking configurations.  
5. As the checker gets sequence of failed replies, it immediately configures the local 
side BGP speaker with one of the BGP solutions, such as Weight with AS-Path 
pre-pending. 
6. Go to step 2 till all the background loads are visited. 
7. Go to step 1 till all the Internet applications are examined. 
8. Change the BGP-based solution and go to step 1 until all the BGP-based solutions 
are evaluated. 
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3.3.3 CONVERGENCE TIME PROCEDURE 
        In this part of the testing, the time between detecting the malicious action and 
recovering from it is measured by the software checker. This time includes, the required 
time for detecting the action, configures the BGP speaker with a solution configuration 
and the required waiting time for getting the echo-replies from the Internet side’s server. 
To be more general, in this work this time is called convergence time. Also, this testing 
procedure is repeated 10 times and the average results are considered. 
The convergence time testing procedure is as follows: 
1. Configures the link between R6 and R7 with the one of the background traffic 
load.  
2. Configures the checker with the BGP-based solution. 
3. Running the checker program. 
4.  The second software configures the malicious router with the blocking 
configuration.  
5. As the checker gets sequence of failed replies, it records the time of blocking, then 
6.  The checker configures the AS100 BGP speaker with the BGP solution. 
7.  The checker maintains a sequence of pings to the same application server, and 
records the time when it gets a successful reply from the server. 
8. Run the third and fourth programs to erase the blocking and the solution 
configurations and clear all the BGP tables. 
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9. Waiting until the BGP tables of the routers in the laboratory builds again without 
the effect of the implemented BGP-based solution. 
10. Go to step 2, if the number of tries is less than 10. 
11. Go to step1 until all the background loads are visited.  
12. Go to step1 until all the BGP-based solutions are evaluated.  
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CHAPTER 4 
VALIDATION, PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION AND RESULTS 
 
         This chapter is divided into three subsections. The first subsection shows the 
baseline testing. The second subsection illustrates the performance figures of the BGP-
based solutions that were proposed by Alrefai [8]. The third subsection illustrates the 
performance figures of our proposed BGP-based solutions. We have measured the BGP-
based solutions with the following background traffic loads: 80%, 50% and 25%. The 
inter-router links in the laboratory are configured with data rates of 1.544 Mbps. The 
80%, 50% and 25% background traffic loads equal to 1.160 Mbps, 758 kbps and 264 
kbps, respectively. This means that the links capacities equal to 384 kbps, 786 kbps and 
1.28 kbps. 
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4.1 VALIDATION OF BGP-BASED SOLUTIONS 
         In the section we validate the capability of the previously discussed methods in 
controlling outgoing or incoming traffic. The capability of these methods is validated in 
our testing laboratory: identical and non-identical scenarios. In addition, the methods 
capability is verified using traceroute and the BGP routing table results. After that, subset 
of the BGP-based solutions will be selected to be evaluated with dissimilar Internet 
applications and background traffic load. The traceroute results of each solution are 
reported and discussed in Appendix D.  
4.1.1 AS-PATH SHORTENING METHOD  
     This method can influence the BGP path selection procedure of a remote AS. In this 
method the concerned region prefixes will be originated from the good IISP network. In 
this way, the AS-Path length will be shortened by one hop. This means that the length of 
the concerned region’s AS-Path that advertised via the malicious IISP will appear in the 
Internet longer by one hop than the one that advertised via the good IISP. However, if a 
remote AS is closer to the malicious IISP than the good IISP by more than one hop it will 
prefer the path through the malicious IISP. This idea is proven after testing this method 
with the non-identical scenario where the AS-Path length from AS100 to AS600 via the 
good IISP is longer than the path between the same two ASes via the malicious IISP. 
Consequently, this method works only in the identical scenario. Figure 6 illustrates a 
scenario where the good IISP originates the concerned region prefixes and the BGP 
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speaker of a remote AS (i.e. AS600) sees the AS-Path via the good IISP as being the 
shortest. The snapshot of traceroute result of the validation of this method in our testing 
laboratory is in Appendix D.  
 
 
FIGURE 6.  AS-PATH SHORTENING EXPLANATORY SCENARIO 
 
 
4.1.2 MORE SPECIFIC PREFIX METHOD 
     This method can influence the BGP path selection procedure of a remote AS. The 
routing table algorithm forwards the traffic over the path associated with the longest 
prefix match. For example, if we have two paths PATH1 and PATH2 advertising the 
The concerned region prefixes are originated 
from this router (good IISP) 
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same prefix but with different length: PATH1 60.70.80.0/24 and PATH2 60.70.80.0/21. 
The path associated with the most specific prefix (i.e. PATH1 60.70.80.0/24) will be used 
to forward the traffic sent to 60.70.80.0 network and PATH2 will be a backup, as shown 
in Figure 7. Also, the Figure shows an example of the R6 BGP routing table during the 
validation of this method in our testing laboratory. When the concerned region advertised 
more specific prefixes via the good IISP, the Internet ASes preferred the path associated 
with this advertisement which is coming through the good IISP. This method works in 
both identical and non-identical scenarios. 
 
 
FIGURE 7. MORE SPECIFIC PREFIXES EXPLANATORY SCENARIO 
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4.1.3 BGP COMMUNITY METHOD 
    Like the previous two methods, this method can influence the BGP selection procedure 
of the upstream ASes whenever they implementing the BGP community. Usually, 
upstream ISPs configure its BGP speaker with a community list that maps between 
customers’ traffic engineering requirements (i.e. Local Preference associated with 
egress/ingress points) and community value. The local AS sends a community value within 
its advertisements to the Internet through a specific upstream IISP, such as the good IISP. 
While the remote AS receives the community request, it performs the traffic engineering 
function mapped to the community value in its community list. Moreover, the local AS can 
sends multiple community value to perform different traffic engineering functions. Figure 
8 illustrates a scenario where the concerned region sends a community value within its 
advertisements to the Internet via the good IISP to attract the incoming traffic through the 
good IISP. Also, the Figure shows the community list where the good IISP and the remote 
AS are configured with in our testing laboratory. This method succeeded while being 
tested with identical and non-identical scenario. 
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FIGURE 8.  BGP COMMUNITY EXPLANATORY SCENARIO. 
 
4.1.4 AS-PATH PRE-PENDING METHOD 
           AS-Path pre-pending method inserts (prepends) extra AS-numbers to the real AS-
Path and advertised the resultant AS-Path, defined here as pre-pended AS-Path, with the 
concerned region advertisements to the Internet through the malicious IISP. Thus, the 
advertised AS-Path through the malicious IISP will appear in the Internet longer than the 
one that advertised via the good IISP.  After validating this method in our testing 
laboratory (identical and non-identical), we found that the AS-Path pre-pending method 
can control incoming and outgoing traffic at the same time. Also, it works with identical 
and non-identical scenario. The method needs some time to converge and the attracting 
capability is limited by the number of ASes that are added to the real AS-Path. For this 
reason, the maximum AS-Path length between any two ASes in the Internet must be 
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identified in order to avoid the possibility of forwarding the incoming traffic via the 
malicious IISP. Some ASes in the Internet are far away from the good IISP and close to 
the malicious IISP by number of hops more than the pre-pended AS-Path length. The 
longest pre-pended AS-Path in the Internet is 34 ASes and the longest real AS-Path is 11 
ASes [31]. In Figure 9 the marked area shows the R6 BGP routing table prefers the AS-
Path that goes through the good IISP (192.0.5.2) to the concerned region (192.0.1.1). And 
the marked area shows all of the AS-Paths that are advertised via the malicious IISP 
router (192.0.10.2) are pre-pended with 3 extra AS100 values (i.e. 100 100 100).              
 
FIGURE 9 BGP TABLE AFTER IMPLEMENTING AS-PATH PREPENDING 
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4.1.5 EBGP MULTIHOP METHOD 
        The eBGP multihop command allows indirectly connected ASes to appear in the 
routing table as if they are directly connected. Consequently, the AS-Path’s length 
between the two configured BGP speakers is such that the inside and outside BGP routers 
will prefer their path over all other existing paths that are physically shorter. To fully 
utilize this method the cooperative AS should reside in a location close to all of the 
required Internet sources and destinations or the concerned region should cooperate with 
multiple ASes residing in distinct locations. 
     This method is similar to the virtual transit method that was proposed by [8], but 
without the overhead and latency of the tunneling protocol. Figure 10 illustrates the 
implementation of this method in the non-identical laboratory. The AS100 and AS600 are 
configured with eBGP multihop to appear in the routing table as if they are close 
neighbors. In the eBGP multihop configuration, as shown in Figure 11, we should assign 
to where the traffic between the two eBGP multihop ASes has to go. In this configuration 
step we tell the BGP speaker how to reach the new neighbor.  For more validation we 
divided the AS600 into two ASes (AS600 and AS700) and configured AS700 and AS100 
with the eBGP multihop configuration to make them appear as close neighbors, as 
illustrated in Figure 12. After this configuration the length of the AS-Path from AS200 to 
AS700 via AS100 and AS400 are not the same. Yet, the proposed solution, eBGP 
multihop, succeeded with this scenario. The AS100 BGP speaker deals with the new 
neighbor (AS600) as a third IISP and just advertising its prefixes to downstream ASes 
(AS100 and AS101).  The distribute-list configuration command allows network 
engineers to control the network prefixes advertisements. In real Internet BGP 
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configurations, ISPs use the distribute-list configuration command to advertise the 
prefixes of the downstream ASes. Furthermore, the command allows downstream ISPs to 
control which prefixes they want to advertise through which upstream ISP. In Figure 13 
the marked area shows the AS100 as if it is a direct neighbor to AS600. The marked area, 
also, shows the interface IP address (192.0.3.1) of the AS100 BGP speaker as a physically 
connected interface with AS600. So, the routing table prefers the path that goes through it 
(i.e. 192.0.3.1) to the concerned region network.     
 
 
 
FIGURE 10. EBGP MULTIHOP BETWEEN AS100 AND AS600 
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FIGURE 11. EBGP CONFIGURATION SAMPLE 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 12. EBGP MULTIHOP BETWEEN AS100 AND AS700  
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FIGURE 13 BGP TABLE AFTER IMPLEMENTING EBGP MULTIHOP 
 
4.1.6 FILTER ADVERTISEMENT METHOD 
     Controlling the advertisements from the concerned region router to neighboring (i.e. 
malicious and good IISP) routers can be achieved through manipulating the 
advertisements and the advertise-map BGP configuration commands and ACL 
commands. These commands enable us to permit or deny specific advertisements to 
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neighboring routers. After validating this method in our testing laboratory we found that 
the filter advertisement method works in identical and non-identical scenario and requires 
some time to converge. In the filter advertisements method implementation we block the 
concerned region prefixes from being advertised to the malicious IISP. In this way the 
concerned region prefixes will not be advertised to the Internet via the malicious IISP.  
Likewise, instead of advertising the concerned region prefixes, we advertise unused 
network prefixes, such as 39.110.0.0/16 and 102.60.70.0/24, to mislead the 
malicious IISP from detecting this method and taking further action. In addition, this 
method can be used to send the outgoing traffic via the good IISP by blocking the 
incoming BGP advertisements from the malicious IISP router. Whereas the first 
implementation can also attract incoming traffic, this implementation can only control 
outgoing traffic. Figure 14 illustrates a scenario where the AS100 BGP speaker instead of 
advertising the concerned region prefix (60.70.80.0) to the malicious IISP, it advertises 
the unused prefix (102.80.70.0) to the malicious IISP. The Figure, also, shows an example 
of the R6 BGP routing table showed during the implementation of this method in our 
testing laboratory.  
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FIGURE 14 FILTERING OUTGOING ADVERTISEMENTS EXPLANATORY SECANRIO. 
 
4.1.7 INTERFACE COUNTER RESET METHOD 
      When the two paths from source to destination are identical the BGP path selection 
procedure prefers the path that goes through the oldest interface. The interface counter 
reset method will reset the counter values of the interface that is connected with the 
malicious IISP making it the newest. As a result, the interface that is connected with the 
good IISP will be older and preferred by the BGP path selection procedure. After 
implementing this method in our testing laboratory, we find that the interface counter 
reset method is a very simple method and does not require long time in configuration. It 
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also has an internal effect such that it is not included in BGP messages and advertisements 
between ASes. Despite these positive characteristics, this method has two major 
drawbacks. The main drawback of this method involves robustness when the preferred 
link goes down and up again, it loses its priority as the oldest link. As a result, the non-
preferred link gains priority and will be preferred. The second drawback is in that this 
method only works in the identical scenario. The snapshot of traceroute result of the 
validation of this method in our testing laboratory is in Appendix D. 
4.1.8 IP STATIC/DEFAULT METHOD 
      The IP static method can work with BGP routing protocol at the same time and it has 
a lower administrative distance (i.e., administrative distance = 1) than the BGP routing 
protocol (i.e., administrative distance = 170). And, the routing table algorithm prefers the 
routing protocol that has a lower administrative distance. The main disadvantage of IP 
static method is that it is not scalable. The network engineer should configure the local 
BGP speaker with all Internet subnets and modifies them whenever they are changed. The 
IP default method has advantages and disadvantages. The main advantages are that it is 
easy to configure and it is not included in the BGP messages and advertisements. Also, it 
can circumvent the isolation in both scenarios: identical and non-identical. In spite of 
these advantages, the main disadvantage of IP default method is that it can only forward 
the traffic that is designated to a network that is not included in the BGP routing table. 
Nevertheless, blocking the incoming advertisements from the malicious router or 
implementing IP static method could overcome this issue. The snapshot of traceroute 
result of the validation of this method in our testing laboratory is in Appendix D. 
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4.1.9 MED METHOD 
          The MED can control outgoing traffic and influence the BGP path selection 
procedure of the close neighbor AS. In addition, it is not advertised further to subsequent 
ASes in the path to the destination. Consequently, it does not influence the BGP path 
selection procedure of the subsequent ASes from source to destination. In addition, as 
described in background section the BGP path selection procedure prefers the shortest 
AS-Path over the MED value. However, when all existing AS-Paths for the same 
destination are identical, like the identical scenario, BGP protocol prefers the path that has 
the lowest MED value. These characteristics of the MED method were validated in our 
testing laboratory and we found that the method requires some time to converge and can 
work only with identical scenario. In Figure 15 the marked area shows the BGP routing 
table prefers the outgoing path associated with lower MED value = nothing.  
 
FIGURE 15 BGP TABLE AFTER IMPLEMENTING MED 
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4.1.10 WEIGHT METHOD 
            After validating the weight method we found that it could control the outgoing 
traffic in the identical and non-identical scenarios. It has an internal effect, and it requires 
time to converge. The marked area in Figure 16 displays the BGP routing table prefers the 
outgoing path associated with higher Weight value = 700 that goes via the good IISP 
(192.0.3.2). The Weight value is neither advertised locally nor externally. 
 
FIGURE 16 BGP TABLE AFTER IMPLEMENTING WEIGHT 
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4.1.11 LOCAL PREFERENCE METHOD 
     After validating the Local Preference method in our testing laboratory we found it can 
control the outgoing traffic in the identical and non-identical scenarios. It is advertised to 
the internal BGP routers and it requires time to converge. The marked area in Figure 17 
illustrates where the BGP routing table prefers the path associated with higher Local 
Preference value = 700 which goes via the good IISP (192.0.3.2). 
 
 
FIGURE 17 BGP TABLE AFTER IMPLEMENTING LOCAL PREFERENCE 
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TABLE 6. COMPARISON BETWEEN BGP METHODS 
 
 
AS-Path 
shortening 
BGP 
community 
More 
specific 
prefix 
Filter 
advertisement 
AS-Path 
prepending 
eBGP 
multihop 
Setup 
Overhead 
Medium High Small Small Small Medium 
AS 
Cooperation 
One AS Several 
ASes 
No No No One AS 
Difficulty of 
Circumvention 
Easy Easy Easy Easy Easy Difficult 
Lab Scenarios Identical Both Both Both Both Both 
Scalability High High High High High High 
 
 
4.2 ADDITIONAL OBSERVATION REGARDING THE 
PRESENTED SOLUTIONS  
      In this section, we compare the BGP methods in terms of setup over head, AS 
cooperation, difficulty of circumvention, laboratory scenarios and scalability, as 
illustrated in Table 7. The setup overhead is the time and efforts needed to have all the 
required solution configurations implemented to execute the BGP method.  Due to the 
time and efforts requires to get the BGP speaker of the remote AS ready and configured, 
the eBGP multihop method has a medium setup overhead relative to other methods. The 
BGP community method has a medium setup overhead because the required time to 
implement the community configurations on the BGP speakers of the cooperative ASes. 
The remaining methods have a small setup overhead because the complete method 
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configuration is performed only in the concerned region’s BGP speaker (i.e., AS-Path 
prepending, filter advertisement and more specific prefix) or in only two BGP speakers 
(i.e.,  AS-Path shortening).  
      AS cooperation considers whether the method needs cooperation from one or more 
ASes in the Internet or not. In AS-Path shortening part of the method configurations are 
implemented in the good IISP’s BGP speaker. The BGP community method needs to be 
performed in some of the ASes between the concerned region and a destination AS. The 
eBGP multihop method requires cooperation from a particular remote AS. Precisely, it 
needs to cooperate with multiple ASes in the Internet to prevent, as much as possible, the 
incoming traffic from going through the malicious IISP.  
     Difficulty of circumvention includes the quantity of time and efforts required by the 
malicious IISP to defeat the implemented method. The AS-Path prepending and filter 
advertisements methods affect advertisements to the malicious IISP. In contrast, eBGP 
multihop, BGP community, AS-Path shortening and more specific prefixes methods affect 
advertisements to the good IISP. When a malicious IISP hijacks the concerned region’s 
prefixes the filter advertisements method will be defeated. Also, the malicious IISP could 
overcome AS-Path prepending method by blocking the incoming advertisements from the 
concerned region and hijacks the concerned region’s prefixes. Moreover, when a 
malicious IISP hijacks the concerned region’s prefixes and advertises them in a more 
specific manner than the prefixes that are advertised via the good IISP, the more specific 
prefixes method will be defeated. The BGP community method will be defeated when the 
remote AS or any AS in the path, via the good IISP, from the source to destination is not 
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performing BGP community. Furthermore, the malicious IISP can advertise the concerned 
region prefixes with the same community value advertised through the good IISP. The 
eBGP multihop method is difficult to combat because the concerned region and remote 
AS are agreed to forward the incoming and outgoing traffic through the good IISP. Also, 
the remote AS is assumed to be closes to the required destination ASes than the malicious 
IISP.  
      The laboratory scenarios means whether the BGP methods succeed while being tested 
with the testing laboratory scenarios or not. The AS-Path shortening method works only 
with the identical scenario because it shortens the AS-Path only by one hop. The 
remaining methods succeeded while being tested with identical and non-identical 
scenario.  
     The scalability means the acceptance of expanding the method or implementing it for 
the entire Internet. All the methods provide high scalability. The prevalence of Internet 
exchange points (IXP) [32] all over the world supports the position that the most effective 
and appropriate solution is eBGP multihop. The concerned region could make an 
agreement with multiple IXPs to be the remote peer ASes in the eBGP multihop method. 
However, the methods can attract the incoming traffic through the good IISP, but the 
methods have some limitations. For example, the ASes that prefers the path that goes 
through the malicious IISP, those where the malicious IISP is the only service provider 
for them, those still see the path through the malicious IISP is the shortest, or those ASes 
that can reach the concerned region only through the malicious IISP.         
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4.3 THE EVALUATED SUBSET OF THE SOLUTIONS’ 
COMBINATIONS  
      After validating the capability of the proposed methods in influencing the incoming 
and outgoing traffic, as discussed in previous subsections. In this work, we select a subset 
from the possible set of the combinations of our proposed solutions that are posted in 
Table 6. There are 15 possible combinations from our proposed solutions. The subset of 
combinations is evaluated with dissimilar Internet applications and background loads. The 
results of this evaluation are posted and discussed in the performance results subsections. 
The subset is posted in Table 8 and the corresponding solutions are called herein the 
considered BGP solutions.  
 There are several reasons for limiting the number of evaluation to these selected 
solutions. Some of the solutions are not robustness and scalable (e.g. IP default/static and 
Interface counter reset) and some of them require cooperation from remote AS (e.g. 
eBGP multihop). Another reason is that the capability of MED and Filter incoming 
advertisements solutions is very similar to Weight and Local Preference solutions and the 
latter two attributes are the first two attributes checked by the BGP path selection 
procedure.   
TABLE 7. COMBINATIONS OF THE CONSIDERED BGP-BASED SOLUTIONS 
 
                  Attracter 
Outforwarder 
AS-Path pre-
pending 
Filter outgoing 
advertisements 
More specific 
prefixes 
Weight       
Local Preference       
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4.4 PERFORMANCE RESULTS 
      This section is divided into three subsections. The first subsection shows the baseline 
testing. The second subsection illustrates the performance figures of the BGP-based 
solutions that proposed by Alrefai [8]. The third subsection illustrates the performance 
figures of our considered BGP-based solutions. In BGP routing protocol to execute new 
changes on the BGP policy and attributes, such as Weight, Local Preference and prefix 
advertisements, the BGP sessions must be reset. There two kinds of reset as following: 
hard reset and soft reset. The hard reset clears all the current BGP sessions to activate the 
new changes. In contrast, the soft reset activates the new changes without clearing the 
current BGP sessions. 
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Over the main path 
 
C:\Users\marwan>ping 192.0.21.4 Server in AS 600 
Pinging 192.0.21.4 with 32 bytes of data: 
Reply from 192.0.21.4: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
Reply from 192.0.21.4: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
Reply from 192.0.21.4: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
 
 
C:\Users\marwan>TRACERT 192.0.21.6 
Tracing route to ALIEN-PC [192.0.21.6] 
over a maximum of 30 hops: 
  1    <1 ms    <1 ms    <1 ms  192.0.1.1 
  2     6 ms     5 ms     5 ms  192.0.12.1  
  3     11 ms     11 ms     11 ms  192.0.2.2  Malicious IISP 
  4    19 ms    19 ms    19 ms  192.0.10.1 
  5    31 ms    31 ms    31 ms  192.0.20.2 
  6    40 ms    40 ms    40 ms  ALIEN-PC [192.0.21.6] 
 
Trace complete. 
 
Over alternate path after shutdown the main one 
 
C:\Users\marwan>ping 192.0.21.6  Server in AS 600 
Pinging 192.0.21.6 with 32 bytes of data: 
Reply from 192.0.21.6: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
Reply from 192.0.21.6: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
Reply from 192.0.21.6: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
 
C:\Users\marwan>TRACERT 192.0.21.6 
Tracing route to ALIEN-PC [192.0.21.6] 
over a maximum of 30 hops: 
  1    <1 ms    <1 ms    <1 ms  192.0.1.1 
  2     6 ms     5 ms     5 ms  192.0.12.1  
  3     10 ms     10 ms     11 ms  192.0.3.2  Good router  
  4    19 ms    19 ms    19 ms  192.0.4.2 
  5    27 ms    27 ms    27 ms  192.0.20.2 
  6    34 ms    34 ms    34 ms  ALIEN-PC [192.0.21.6] 
Trace complete.  
 
FIGURE 18. PING AND TRACEROUTE RESULTS FROM LOCAL TO INTERNET SIDE IN OUR LAB 
OVER THE PREFERRED AND ALTERNATIVE PATHS IN IDENTICAL SCENARIO 
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4.4.1 BASELINE TESTING 
     This section shows the baseline results of the Internet applications under different 
background traffic loads and the basic connectivity and configuration testing of the two 
laboratory scenarios. Figure 18 shows a ping and traceroute results from the local side 
BGP speaker to the FTP server located in the Internet side over the primary path and 
alternative path in the identical scenario.  The primary path passes through the malicious 
IISP and the alternative path passes through the good IISP. Figure 19 display a ping and 
traceroute results from the local side BGP speaker to the FTP server over the primary 
path and alternative path in the non-identical scenario. Also, Figure 20 illustrates the 
baseline throughput of the Internet applications under different background traffic load. 
The y-axis in the figure displays the throughput in bit per second and the x-axis displays 
the examined Internet applications with different background traffic load. The baseline 
end-to-end delay of the FTP and HTTP applications under the background traffic load is 
shown in Figure 21. The y-axis in the figure displays the time in seconds and the x-axis 
displays the examined Internet applications with different background traffic load (i.e. 
FTP1.28Mb is FTP stream with 1.28Mbps link capacity). Figure 22 shows the debug 
results after implementing the AS-Path prepending + weight solution in AS100 BGP 
speaker. In both debug results message 1 is the debug output from R1 and message 2 is 
the debug output from R6. The time required for the BGP table to build up again with 
hard reset is about 60 seconds and with soft reset is 134 msec.    
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Over the main path 
 
C:\Users\marwan>ping 192.0.21.4 Server in AS 600 
Pinging 192.0.21.4 with 32 bytes of data: 
Reply from 192.0.21.4: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
Reply from 192.0.21.4: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
Reply from 192.0.21.4: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
 
C:\Users\marwan>TRACERT 192.0.21.6 
Tracing route to ALIEN-PC [192.0.21.6] 
over a maximum of 30 hops: 
  1    <1 ms    <1 ms    <1 ms  192.0.1.1 
  2     5 ms     5 ms     5 ms  192.0.2.2  Malicious IISP 
  3    17 ms    17 ms    17 ms  192.0.10.1 
  4    25 ms    25 ms    25 ms  192.0.20.2 
  5    33 ms    33 ms    33 ms  ALIEN-PC [192.0.21.6] 
 
Trace complete. 
 
Over alternate path after shutdown the main one 
 
C:\Users\marwan>ping 192.0.21.6  Server in AS 600 
Pinging 192.0.21.6 with 32 bytes of data: 
Reply from 192.0.21.6: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
Reply from 192.0.21.6: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
Reply from 192.0.21.6: bytes=32 time=23ms TTL=124 
 
C:\Users\marwan>TRACERT 192.0.21.6 
Tracing route to ALIEN-PC [192.0.21.6] 
over a maximum of 30 hops: 
  1    <1 ms    <1 ms    <1 ms  192.0.1.1 
  2     6 ms     5 ms     5 ms  192.0.12.1  
  3    11 ms    11 ms    11 ms  192.0.3.2  Good router  
  4    20 ms    20 ms    21 ms  192.0.4.2 
  5    27 ms    27 ms    27 ms  192.0.5.1 
  6    33 ms    33 ms    34 ms  192.0.20.2 
  7    40 ms    39 ms    39 ms  ALIEN-PC [192.0.21.6] 
Trace complete.  
 
FIGURE 19. PING AND TRACEROUTE RESULTS FROM LOCAL TO INTERNET SIDE IN OUR LAB 
OVER THE PREFERRED AND ALTERNATIVE PATHS IN NON-IDENTICAL SCENARIO 
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FIGURE 20. THE BASELINE THROUGHPUT OF THE INTERNET APPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
FIGURE 21. THE BASELINE END-TO-END DELAY OF THE FTP AND HTTP APPLICATIONS 
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FIGURE 22. THE DEBUG RESULTS FOR HARD AND SOFT RESET. 
 
4.4.2 PERFORMANCE FIGURES OF BGP-BASED SOLUTIONS THAT 
WERE PROPOSED BY ALREFAI [8] 
   We have evaluated the proposed solutions using two different laboratory scenarios, 
identical and non-identical. We found that the AS-Path shortening + Local Preference 
solutions can work only with the identical scenario. In contrast, the more specific prefix + 
Local Preference and BGP community + Local Preference can work in the identical and 
non-identical scenario. We noticed the HTTP starts slowly in begging of opening the 
webpage and it is again starts slowly after recovering from the blocking incident. 
4.4.2.1 CONVERGENCE TIME RESULTS 
    The average results of 10 runs of the convergence time procedure of each of the BGP-
based solutions with different background traffic loads are illustrated in Figure 23 and 24. 
The y-axis represents the time in seconds and the x-axis represents the evaluated solutions 
with different background traffic load. Figure 23 displays the hard reset convergence time 
and Figure 24 displays the soft reset convergence time compared with the soft reset 
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convergence time results obtained from Alrefai work. The resultant hard reset 
convergence time of the evaluated solutions is between 63 to 64 seconds, and between 0.1 
to 0.3 second for soft reset convergence time. The obtained convergence time of Alrefai 
work is between 0.3 to 0.6 second. The increase in convergence time results of Alrefai is 
due to the introduced 100 mille second delay while measuring the convergence time. The 
convergence time exchanged messages are few in number and small in size.  Thus, the 
affect of the background traffic load on the convergence time is very small. The more 
specific prefix + Local Preference solution always gives the fastest convergence time 
even with the different background traffic loads. 
 
 
FIGURE 23. HARD RESET CONVERGENCE TIME RESULTS OF THE ALREFAI BGP-BASED 
SOLUTIONS. NOTE: LP = LOCAL PREFERENCE 
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FIGURE 24. SOFT RESET CONVERGENCE TIME RESULTS OF THE ALREFAI BGP-BASED 
SOLUTIONS. NOTE: LP = LOCAL PREFERENCE, W = WEIGHT AND AH PREFIX ADDED TO 
ALREFAI RESULTS. 
 
4.4.2.2 THE PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN THE END-TO-END DELAY 
     The percentage increase in the end-to-end delay of the examined Internet applications 
is shown in Figure 25. The y-axis in the figure displays the percentage and the x-axis 
displays the examined Internet applications with different background traffic load. The 
evaluated solutions are posted on the legend. We examined the FTP end-to-end delay by 
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downloading a file stored on the FTP server residing in the Internet side from the FTP 
client installed in the workstation resides in the local side.  After downloading 15% of the 
downloaded file the blocking action is performed, then the solution is activated. The same 
procedure is performed to examine the HTTP but with 6 MB webpage and the blocking 
action is performed after downloading 10% of the webpage. This means the hard reset 
convergence time is included in the posted end-to-end delay results in Figure 25. The 
more specific prefix + Local Preference solution provided the lowest end-to-end delay 
among the evaluated solutions. 
 
4.4.2.3 PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC DROP 
     The percentage of the lost packets for the evaluated BGP solutions is displayed in 
Figure 26. The y-axis represents the percentage of lost packets in relation to sent packets. 
By traffic drop, we mean the number of lost packets that were dropped during the 
blocking incident. The percentage of the lost packets with the HTTP application is double 
the value of the FTP application. This small percentage proves the sensitivity of the TCP 
protocol to the carrier. The percentage of the lost packets for the VoIP is in the range of 
40% to 41% for all the evaluated solutions and cannot be set in the same graph together 
with the TCP applications. 
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FIGURE 25. THE PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN END-TO-END DELAY OF THE EXAMINED 
INTERNET APPLICATIONS. 
 
4.4.2.4 SUMMARY 
     The BGP-based solutions that are proposed by Alrefai [8] were prototyped and 
evaluated in a real laboratory. The laboratory was configured with the configurations that 
are usually applied in ISP routers. Furthermore, the solutions were evaluated in two 
different laboratory scenarios: identical and non-identical. The effects of these solutions 
were measured by implementing them for different Internet application streams: FTP, 
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HTTP and VoIP. The evaluating procedures were also conducted with different 
background traffic loads: 80%, 50% and 25%. The obtained hard reset convergence time 
is in the range of 63 – 64 seconds and soft reset convergence time is between 0.1 and 0.3 
second for all of the evaluated solutions. The maximum percentage of the end-to-end 
delay is about 230% found with HTTP1.28Mbps and about 190% with FTP1.28Mbps. 
The minimum percentage is about 30% found with FTP384kbps and about 55% with 
HTTP384kbps. All the evaluated solutions succeeded while being tested with identical 
and non-identical scenarios with the exception of the AS-Path shortening solution. This 
was a result of shortening the AS-Path by only one hop. 
 
 
FIGURE 26. PERCENTAGE OF THE LOST PACKETS DURING THE BLOCKING ACTION 
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4.4.3 PERFORMANCE FIGURES OF THE RECOMMENDED BGP-
BASED SOLUTIONS THAT PROPOSED IN THIS WORK 
4.4.3.1 CONVERGENCE TIME RESULTS 
    The average of 10 runs of the convergence time procedure of each recommended BGP 
solutions with different background traffic load are illustrated in Figure 27 and 28. The y-
axis represents the time in seconds and the x-axis represents the evaluated solutions with 
different background traffic load. Figure 27 displays the hard reset convergence time and 
Figure 28 show the soft reset convergence time. The result hard reset convergence time of 
the evaluated solutions is between 63 to 64 seconds and the obtained soft reset 
convergence time is between 0.1 and 0.3 second. The convergence time exchanged 
messages are few in number and small in size.  Thus, the affect of the background traffic 
load on the convergence time is very small. The combination of filter outgoing 
advertisement + weight always gives the fastest convergence time even with the different 
background traffic load. The filter outgoing advertisement solution blocks the concerned 
region prefixes from being advertised to the Internet through the malicious IISP. Also, it 
does not change or introduce any load on the BGP advertisements, unlike AS-Path pre-
pending and more specific prefixes solutions. The same results and capability of the 
proposed solutions are proved with the non-identical scenario as shown in Figure 29 and 
30 for hard reset convergence time and soft reset convergence time, respectively.  
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FIGURE 27. HARD RESET CONVERGENCE TIME RESULTS OF THE BGP-BASED SOLUTIONS IN 
IDENTICAL SCENARIO 
 
 
FIGURE 28. HARD RESET CONVERGENCE TIME RESULTS OF THE BGP-BASED SOLUTIONS IN 
NON-IDENTICAL SCENARIO. 
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FIGURE 29. SOFT RESET CONVERGENCE TIME RESULTS OF THE BGP-BASED SOLUTIONS IN 
IDENTICAL SCENARIO. 
 
 
FIGURE 30. SOFT RESET CONVERGENCE TIME RESULTS OF THE BGP-BASED SOLUTIONS IN 
IDENTICAL SCENARIO 
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4.4.3.2 PERFORMANCE FIGURES FOR FTP STREAM 
END-TO-END DELAY 
     In this section the end-to-end delay of the FTP application in the identical and non-
identical scenario is discussed and the results are shown in Figure 31 and 32, respectively. 
The y-axis in the figure displays the time in seconds. The evaluated solutions are posted 
on the legend. We examined the FTP end-to-end delay by downloading a 10 MB file 
stored on the FTP server residing in the Internet side (AS600) from the FTP client 
installed in the workstation resides in the local side (AS100).  After downloading 15% of 
the downloaded file the blocking action is performed, then the solution is activated. This 
means that the hard reset convergence time is included in the posted end-to-end delay and 
the percentage increase results in the two figures. The combination of the filter outgoing 
advertisements + Weight  solution provided the lowest end-to-end delay among the 
evaluated solutions followed by more specific prefixes + Weight solution with small 
difference in time. The end-to-end delay increases proportionally with the increase in the 
background traffic load. There is a small difference between the end-to-end delay results 
of the identical and non-identical scenarios. Figure 33 and 34 illustrate the percentage 
increase in the end-to-end delay of the FTP application in the identical and non-identical 
scenarios, respectively. The percentage of the end-to-end delay increases inversely with 
the increase in the background traffic load. Besides, the differences in end-to-end delay 
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between the evaluated solutions are in the range of 6%. Also, the difference between the 
end-to-end delay results from the identical and non-identical scenarios is in the range of 
6%. Moreover, the differences in the percentage of end-to-end delay between the 
evaluated solutions are in the range of 18%. And, the difference between the percentage 
of the end-to-end delay results from the identical and non-identical scenario is in the range 
of 16%. 
 
  
FIGURE 31. END-TO-END DELAY OF THE FTP APPLICATIONS IN IDENTICAL SCENARIO 
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FIGURE 32. END-TO-END DELAY OF THE FTP APPLICATION IN NON-IDENTICAL SCENARIO 
 
 
 
FIGURE 33. PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF END-TO-END DELAY OF THE FTP APPLICATION IN 
IDENTICAL SCENARIO. 
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FIGURE 34. PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN END-TO-END DELAY OF THE FTP APPLICATION NON-
IDENTICAL. 
 
 
 
PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC DROP 
     The percentage of the lost packets for the evaluated BGP solutions in the identical and 
non-identical scenario is displayed in Figure 35 and Figure 36, respectively. The y-axis 
represents the percentage of lost packets in relation to sent packets and the x-axis 
represents the examined FTP application with dissimilar background traffic load. By 
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traffic drop, we mean the number of lost packets that were dropped during the blocking 
incident. Obviously, since there was no significant difference in the convergence time of 
the evaluated solutions, there will not be a significant difference on the number of the lost 
packets. This small percentage proves the sensitivity of the TCP protocol to the carrier. In 
summary, the differences in the percentage of lost packets between the evaluated 
solutions are in the range of 8%. Also, the difference between the percentage of the lost 
packets results in the identical and non-identical scenario is in the range of 15%.   
 
FIGURE 35. PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC DROP OF THE FTP APPLICATIONS IN IDENTICAL 
SCENARIO 
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FIGURE 36. PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC DROP OF THE FTP APPLICATIONS IN NON-IDENTICAL 
 
AVERAGE THROUGHPUT 
     The average throughput in bits per second of the examined FTP application with the 
evaluated solutions is depicted in Figure 37 and 38. The y-axis represents the bits per 
second values and the x-axis represents the examined FTP application with different 
background traffic load. The evaluated solutions are displayed on the legend. We 
examined the FTP average throughput by downloading a 10 MB file stored on the FTP 
server residing on the Internet side (AS600) from FTP client installed in the workstation 
residing on the local side (AS100). The posted average throughputs in the two figures are 
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affected by the hard reset convergence time. The TCP applications proved their sensitivity 
to the link capacity where their throughput increased proportionally with the increase in 
link capacity. The combination of filter outgoing advertisements + Weight solution 
provided the highest average throughput among the evaluated solutions followed by more 
specific prefixes + Weight solution without much difference in throughput. In summary, 
the differences in average throughput between the evaluated solutions are in the range of 
7%. Also, the difference between the average throughput results in the identical and non-
identical scenario is in the range of 9%.   
 
 
FIGURE 37. AVERAGE THROUGHPUTS OF THE FTP APPLICATIONS IN IDENTICAL SCENARIO 
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FIGURE 38. AVERAGE THROUGHPUTS OF THE FTP APPLICATION IN NON-IDENTICAL 
SCENARIO 
4.4.3.3 PERFORMANCE FIGURES FOR HTTP STREAM 
END-TO-END DELAY 
     In this section the end-to-end delay of the HTTP application in the identical and non-
identical scenarios is investigated and the results are shown in Figure 39 and 40, 
respectively. The y-axis in the figure displays the time in seconds and the x-axis displays 
the examined Internet applications with different background traffic load. The evaluated 
solutions are posted on the legend. The end-to-end delay increases proportionally with the 
increase in the background traffic load. Figure 41 and 42 illustrate the percentage increase 
in the end-to-end delay of the examined Internet applications. The end-to-end delay of the 
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HTTP application increases proportionally with the increase in the background traffic 
load. The obtained end-to-end delay includes the hard reset convergence time. Also, the 
percentage increase in the end-to-end delay of the HTTP application increases inversely 
with the background traffic load. In summary, the differences in end-to-end delay between 
the evaluated solutions are in the range of 5%. Also, the difference between the end-to-
end delay results from the identical and non-identical scenarios is in the range of 6%. 
Moreover, the differences in the percentage of end-to-end delay between the evaluated 
solutions are in the range of 16%. And, the difference between the percentage of the end-
to-end delay results from the identical and non-identical scenarios is in the range of 16%. 
 
  
FIGURE 39. END-TO-END DELAY OF THE HTTP APPLICATIONS IN IDENTICAL SCENARIO 
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FIGURE 40. END-TO-END DELAY OF THE HTTP APPLICATIONS IN NON-IDENTICAL SCENARIO 
 
 
 
FIGURE 41. PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN END-TO-END DELAY OF THE HTTP APPLICATIONS 
IDENTICAL. 
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FIGURE 42. PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN END-TO-END DELAY OF THE HTTP APPLICATIONS 
NON-IDENTICAL. 
 
PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC DROP 
     The percentage of the lost packets for the examined HTTP application in the identical 
and non-identical scenarios is displayed in Figure 43 and 44, respectively. The y-axis 
represents the percentage of lost packets in relation to the sent packets and the x-axis 
represents the examined HTTP application with dissimilar background traffic load. The 
percentage of the lost packets with the HTTP application is double the value of the FTP 
application in the previous subsection, which means that the FTP is more sensitive to the 
carrier than HTTP. In summary, the differences in the percentage of lost packets between 
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the evaluated solutions during the testing of HTTP stream are in the range of 12%. Also, 
the difference between the percentage of the lost packets results from the identical and 
non-identical scenario is in the range of 9%.  
 
 
FIGURE 43. PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC DROP OF THE HTTP APPLICATION IN IDENTICAL 
SCENARIO 
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FIGURE 44. PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC DROP OF THE HTTP APPLICATION IN NON-IDENTICAL 
 
AVERAGE THROUGHPUT 
     The average throughput in bits per second of the investigated HTTP application in the 
identical and non-identical scenario with the evaluated solutions is illustrated in Figure 45 
and 46. The y-axis represents the bits per second and the x-axis represents the examined 
Internet application with different background traffic load. The evaluated solutions are 
displayed on the legend. We examined the HTTP average throughput by accessing a 6 
MB webpage stored on the HTTP server residing on the Internet side from an Internet 
browser installed in the workstation residing on the local side. The resultant average 
HTTP throughput is affected by the hard reset convergence time. The average throughput 
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of the evaluated solutions with FTP is higher by 15% than the throughput of these 
solutions with the HTTP application. In any case, the differences in the average HTTP 
throughput between the evaluated solutions are in the range of 4%. Also, the difference 
between the average HTTP throughput results from the identical and non-identical 
scenarios is in the range of 6%.   
 
FIGURE 45. AVERAGE THROUGHPUTS OF THE HTTP APPLICATIONS IN IDENTICAL SCENARIO 
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FIGURE 46. AVERAGE THROUGHPUTS OF THE HTTP APPLICATION IN NON-IDENTICAL 
SCENARIO 
4.4.3.4 PERFORMANCE FIGURES FOR VOIP STREAM 
PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC DROP 
     The VoIP is a real-time application that works over the UDP protocol. Unlike TCP 
protocol, the UDP does not have a reliability and congestion control mechanisms. The 
UDP protocol tries to forward the traffic as fast as possible regardless to the carrier and 
receiver capacity. The percentage of traffic drop for the examined VoIP application with 
the evaluated solutions in the identical and non-identical scenarios is displayed in Figure 
47 and 48, respectively. The y-axis represents the percentage of traffic drop in relation to 
the sent packets and the x-axis represents the examined VoIP application with dissimilar 
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background traffic load. Due to the fact that UDP protocol is insensitive to the carrier, the 
results show a significant increase in the percentage of the lost packets when compared 
with previous TCP applications. In summary, the differences in the percentage of lost 
packets between the evaluated solutions are in the range of 5%. Also, the difference 
between the percentage of the lost packets results from the identical and non-identical 
scenarios is in the range of 4%. 
 
FIGURE 47. PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC DROP OF THE VOIP APPLICATIONS IN IDENTICAL 
SCENARIO 
 
%
)
   
   
   
(
P
ac
k
et
s 
d
ro
op
ed
/s
en
t 
p
ac
k
et
s 
  
84 
 
FIGURE 48. PERCENTAGE OF TRAFFIC DROP OF THE VOIP APPLICATIONS IN NON-IDENTICAL 
 
AVERAGE THROUGHPUT 
     The average throughput in bits per second of the examined VoIP application with the 
evaluated solutions in the identical and non-identical scenarios is depicted in Figure 49 
and 50, respectively. The y-axis represents the bits per second and the x-axis represents 
the examined Internet application with different background traffic load. The evaluated 
solutions are displayed on the legend. We examined the VoIP average throughput by 
performing 120 second UDP traffic from an iperf client installed in a workstation residing 
on the local side to an iperf server installed in a server residing on the Internet side. 
During the call, at the instant in time that the blocking action is performed the solution is 
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activated. This means that the posted average throughput in the two figures is affected by 
the hard reset convergence time. In any case, the differences in the average throughput 
between the evaluated solutions are in the range of 3%. Also, the difference between the 
average throughput results from the identical and non-identical scenarios is in the range of 
6%.   
 
 
 
FIGURE 49. AVERAGE THROUGHPUTS OF THE VOIP APPLICATIONS IN IDENTICAL SCENARIO 
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FIGURE 50. AVERAGE THROUGHPUTS OF THE VOIP APPLICATIONS IN NON-IDENTICAL 
SCENARIO 
 
 
4.4.3.5 SUMMARY 
     The BGP-based solutions that are proposed here were prototyped and evaluated in a 
real laboratory. Moreover, the solutions were evaluated in two different laboratory 
scenarios: identical and non-identical. The effects of these solutions were measured by 
implementing them for different Internet application streams: FTP, HTTP and VoIP. The 
evaluating procedures were also conducted with different background traffic loads: 80%, 
50%, and 25%. In both laboratory scenarios, the obtained hard reset convergence time is 
in the range of 63 – 64 seconds for all of the evaluated solutions. In identical scenario and 
non-identical scenario the resultant soft reset convergence time is between 0.1 – 0.3 and 
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0.1 – 0.4 second, respectively, for all of the evaluated solutions. The maximum percentage 
of the end-to-end delay is about 230% found with HTTP1.28Mbps and about 190% with 
FTP1.28Mbps. The minimum percentage of the end-to-end delay is about 30% found with 
FTP384kbps and about 55% with HTTP384kbps. All the evaluated solutions work fine 
with identical and non-identical scenario. In the non-identical scenario, the addition of one 
router in the path between the source and destination has no considerable effect on the 
performance figures of the investigated Internet applications even under different 
background traffic load. As well, the differences according to the performance figures 
between the evaluated solutions are in the range of 3% - 18%. Also, the differences 
between the performance figures from identical and non-identical scenario are in the 
range of 4% - 16%.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 5.1 CONCLUSION  
               
     The importance of Internet availability is supported by the overwhelming dependence 
of government services and financial institutions upon the said availability. In this work 
we prototype, evaluate and enhance the BGP-based solutions that are proposed by Alrefai 
[8].  The solutions address incidences wherein the primary IISP of the concerned region 
intentionally blocks its incoming and outgoing Internet traffic. Consequently, any traffic 
that passes through this IISP, defined here as malicious IISP, will be blocked. Under the 
assumption of the availability of a secondary IISP, called here good IISP, we performed 
this work. 
    The outgoing traffic is under the control of the concerned region which makes it easy to 
control. But the incoming traffic is under the control of remote and intermediate ASes 
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between the source and destinations. Alrefai [8] proposed three solutions that can control 
the outgoing traffic and attract the incoming traffic via an available good IISP. The 
Alrefai solutions include BGP tuning, virtual peering and virtual transit. In this work we 
have prototyped and evaluated the BGP tuning techniques: BGP community, AS-Path 
shortening and more specific prefix. The evaluations are performed in two dissimilar 
laboratory scenarios: identical and non-identical.  The AS-Path shortening solution can 
work only with the identical scenario. The performance figures of these solutions are 
almost the same in both scenarios.  
       In this work we proposed thirty-three combinations of the BGP-based solutions that 
can the control outgoing traffic and influence the incoming traffic. Some of them can 
work only with the identical scenario such as the interface counter reset and AS-Path 
shortening method. Based on the results of the prototyping and evaluation of the BGP-
based solutions, we observe that the filter outgoing advertisements and more specific 
prefix methods perform the best. Based on the discussion in section 4.2, the malicious 
IISP can easily defeat the filter outgoing advertisements and more specific prefix methods. 
In contrast, the eBGP multihop method is difficult to be defeated by the malicious IISP. 
The availability of making a service agreement with Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) to 
be remote cooperative ASes strengthens the eBGP multihop based solutions. The eBGP 
multihop method may cooperate with several IXPs attracting almost all of the concerned 
region traffic via the good IISP. Consequently, it is recommended to use the eBGP 
multihop based solutions for the deployment. 
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5.2 FUTURE WORK 
         In this section, we will discuss open research areas related to the Internet denial 
issue. Some of these areas are: 
A. Detection Mechanism: Internet access denial could be caused by malicious or 
non-malicious action. Also, it could be performed by any AS in the path from a 
source to a destination. Moreover, a malicious AS can use a technique to hide the 
blocking action. The detection mechanism needs more attention than only a simple 
ping based mechanism.  
B. Prefix Hijacking Prevention: There are many research efforts and applied 
solutions for prefix hijacking detection and prevention, yet the Internet continues 
to face serious prefix hijacking incidents. 
C. BGP Misconfiguration Detection and Prevention: Many Internet access/service 
denial and destabalizing events have occurred due to BGP misconfiguration. BGP 
misconfiguration detection techniques require more attention and exploiting new 
techniques, such as using intelligent techniques in detecting the misconfiguration 
and this may lead to effective solutions and/or prevention.  
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APPENDIX A  
ROUTER CONFIGURATION 
 
 
! 
version 12.4 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no service password-encryption 
! 
hostname R0 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
logging buffered 51200 warnings 
! 
no aaa new-model 
dot11 syslog 
! 
! 
ip cef 
! 
! 
no ip domain lookup 
ip domain name yourdomain.com 
! 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
! 
! 
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-2730237386 
 enrollment selfsigned 
 subject-name cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-2730237386 
 revocation-check none 
 rsakeypair TP-self-signed-2730237386 
! 
! 
username ccseadmin privilege 15 secret 5 $1$SwoA$p08RE7R/qBa9pKZKAQ/v.1 
archive 
 log config 
  hidekeys 
!  
! 
! 
! 
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! 
! 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
 description $ETH-LAN$$ETH-SW-LAUNCH$$INTF-INFO-FE 0/0$ 
 ip address 192.0.1.1 255.255.255.0 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 ip address 192.0.12.2 255.255.255.252 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface Serial0/0/0 
 no ip address 
 no keepalive 
! 
router bgp 100 
 no synchronization 
 bgp log-neighbor-changes 
 redistribute connected 
 neighbor 192.0.12.1 remote-as 100 
 no auto-summary 
! 
ip forward-protocol nd 
! 
! 
ip http server 
ip http access-class 23 
ip http authentication local 
ip http secure-server 
ip http timeout-policy idle 60 life 86400 requests 10000 
! 
! 
! 
 
 
 
 
! 
! 
control-plane 
! 
banner exec                                                                           
% Password expiration warning. 
 
username <myuser> privilege 15 secret 0 <mypassword> 
  
Replace <myuser> and <mypassword> with the username and password you want to  
use. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
! 
line con 0 
 login local 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
 access-class 23 in 
 privilege level 15 
 password (($3 
 login 
 transport input telnet ssh 
line vty 5 15 
 access-class 23 in 
 privilege level 15 
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 login local 
 transport input telnet ssh 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1000 
! 
end 
 
 
 
FIGURE A. 1 R0 CONFIGURATION 
 
 
 
! 
version 12.4 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime 
 msec 
no service password-encryption 
! 
hostname R1 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
 
logging buffered 51200 warnings 
! 
no aaa new-model 
dot11 syslog 
! 
! 
ip cef 
! 
! 
no ip domain  
lookup 
ip domain name yourdomain.com 
! 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
! 
! 
crypto  
pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-2765050578 
 enrollment selfsigned 
 subject-name  
cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-2765050578 
 revocation-check none 
 rsakeypair  
TP-self-signed-2765050578 
! 
! 
crypto pki certificate chain TP-self-signed-2765050578 
  
! 
! 
username ccseadmin privilege 15 secret 5 $1$I8g.$ZNAW32fDnwDaaDnFLgFtG/ 
 
archive 
 log config 
  hidekeys 
!  
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
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! 
 
interface Tunnel0 
  
! 
 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
  
description $ETH-LAN$$ETH-SW-LAUNCH$$INTF-INFO-FE 0/0$ 
  
ip address 192.0.12.1 255.255.255.0 
  
duplex auto 
 speed auto 
 
! 
 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
  
no ip address 
  
shutdown 
  
duplex auto 
  
speed auto 
 
! 
 
interface Serial0/0/0 
  
ip address 192.0.2.1 255.255.255.252 
  
no keepalive 
 
 clock rate 256000 
 
! 
 
interface Serial0/2/0 
  
ip address 192.0.3.1 255.255.255.252 
 
 no keepalive 
  
clock rate 256000 
 
! 
 
router bgp 100 
 
no synchronization 
  
bgp log-neighbor-changes 
  
redistribute connected 
  
neighbor 192.0.12.2 remote-as 100 
 
 neighbor 192.0.2.2 remote-as 300 
 
 neighbor 192.0.3.2 remote-as 200 
  
 
 no auto-summary 
! 
ip 
 forward-protocol nd 
 
! 
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! 
 
ip http server 
 
ip http access-class 23 
 
ip http authentication  
local 
ip http secure-server 
 
ip http timeout-policy  
idle 60 life 86400 requests 10000 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
! 
 
! 
 
control-plane 
! 
banner exec                                                                           
% Password expiration warning. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
                                                                          
! 
line con 0 
 login local 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
 privilege level 15 
 password (($3 
 login 
 transport input telnet ssh 
line vty 5 15 
 access-class 23 in 
 privilege level 15 
 login local 
 transport input telnet ssh 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1000 
! 
end 
 
 
FIGURE A. 2 R1 CONFIGURATION 
 
 
! 
version 12.4 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime  
msec 
no service password-encryption 
 
! 
 
hostname R2 
 
! 
 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
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! 
 
logging buffered 51200 warnings 
! 
no aaa new-model 
dot11 syslog 
 
! 
 
! 
 
ip cef 
 
! 
 
! 
 
no ip domain lookup 
 
ip domain name yourdomain.com 
 
! 
 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
 
! 
 
! 
 
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-3254364069 
 enrollment selfsigned 
 subject-name  
cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-3254364069 
 revocation-check none 
 rsakeypair TP-self-signed-3254364069 
 
! 
 
! 
 
crypto pki certificate chain TP-self-signed-3254364069 
 certificate self-signed 
 
! 
 
! 
 
username ccseadmin privilege 15 secret 5 $1$rUAF$Yp1vIQFatFj3lZnV8MsO00 
archive 
 log config 
  hidekeys 
 
!  
 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
 
 description $ETH-LAN$$ETH-SW-LAUNCH$$INTF-INFO-FE 0/0$ 
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ip address 192.0.29.1 255.255.255.0 
  
duplex auto 
 speed auto 
 
! 
 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 
 no ip address 
 
 shutdown 
  
duplex auto 
 speed auto 
 
! 
 
interface Serial0/0/0 
  
ip address 192.0.4.1 255.255.255.252 
 
 no keepalive 
 
! 
 
interface Serial0/2/0 
 
 ip address 192.0.3.2 255.255.255.252 
  
no keepalive 
 
! 
 
router bgp 200 
  
no synchronization 
 
 bgp log-neighbor-changes 
 
 redistribute connected 
  
neighbor 192.0.3.1 remote-as 100 
 
 neighbor 192.0.4.2 remote-as 300 
 
 no auto-summary 
 
! 
 
ip forward-protocol nd 
 
! 
 
! 
 
ip http server 
 
ip http access-class 23 
 
ip http authentication local 
 
ip http secure-server 
 
ip http timeout-policy idle 60 life 86400 requests 10000 
 
! 
 
! 
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! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
control-plane 
 
username <myuser> privilege 15 secret 0 <mypassword> 
  
Replace <myuser> and <mypassword> with the username and password you want to  
use. 
  
! 
line con 0 
 login local 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
 privilege level 15 
 password (($3 
 login 
 transport input telnet ssh 
line vty 5 15 
 access-class 23 in 
 privilege level 15 
 login local 
 transport input telnet ssh 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1000 
! 
end 
 
 
FIGURE A. 3 R2 CONFIGURATION 
 
 
! 
version 12.4 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no  
service password-encryption 
 
! 
 
hostname R3 
 
! 
 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
 
! 
 
logging buffered 51200 warnings 
 
! 
 
no aaa new-model 
dot11 syslog 
 
! 
 
! 
 
ip cef 
 
! 
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! 
 
no ip domain lookup 
 
ip domain name yourdomain.com 
 
! 
 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
 
! 
 
! 
 
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-2000161258 
 enrollment selfsigned 
 subject-name  
cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-2000161258 
 revocation-check none 
 rsakeypair TP-self-signed-2000161258 
 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
username ccseadmin privilege 15 secret 5 $1$6CjN$hu6.ZK3PKBWL23NC4GU/E/ 
archive 
 log config 
  hidekeys 
 
!  
 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
interface Loopback0 
 
 ip address 3.3.3.3 255.255.255.255 
 
! 
 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
 
 description $ETH-LAN$$ETH-SW-LAUNCH$$INTF-INFO-FE 0/0$ 
 
 ip address 10.10.10.1 255.255.255.248 
 
 duplex auto 
  
speed auto 
 
! 
 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 
 no ip address 
 
 shutdown 
  
100 
 
 duplex auto 
 
 speed auto 
 
! 
 
interface Serial1/0 
 
 ip address 192.0.2.2 255.255.255.252 
 
 ip access-group 1 in 
 
 ip access-group 1 out 
 
 no keepalive 
 
! 
 
interface Serial1/1 
 
 ip address 192.0.4.2 255.255.255.252 
 
 no keepalive 
  
clock rate 2000000 
 
! 
 
interface Serial1/2 
 
 ip address 192.0.5.1 255.255.255.252 
 
 no keepalive 
  
clock rate 2000000 
! 
 
interface Serial1/3 
 
 ip address 192.0.10.1 255.255.255.252 
 
 no keepalive 
 
 clock rate 2000000 
 
! 
 
router bgp 300 
 no synchronization 
 bgp log-neighbor-changes 
 redistribute connected 
 neighbor 192.0.2.1 remote-as 100 
 neighbor 192.0.4.1 remote-as 200 
 neighbor 192.0.5.2 remote-as 400 
 neighbor 192.0.10.2 remote-as 600 
 no auto-summary 
! 
ip forward-protocol nd 
! 
! 
ip http server 
ip http access-class 23 
ip http authentication local 
ip http secure-server 
ip http timeout-policy idle 60 life 86400 requests 10000 
! 
! 
! 
! 
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! 
control-plane 
! 
banner exec                                                                           
 
username <myuser> privilege 15 secret 0 <mypassword> 
  
Replace <myuser> and <mypassword> with the username and password you want to  
use. 
  
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                                          
! 
line con 0 
 login local 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
 privilege level 15 
 password (($3 
 login 
 transport input telnet ssh 
line vty 5 15 
 access-class 23 in 
 privilege level 15 
 login local 
 transport input telnet ssh 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1000 
! 
end 
 
 
FIGURE A. 4 R3 CONFIGURATION 
 
 
! 
version 12.4 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no  
service password-encryption 
! 
hostname R4 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
 
! 
 
logging buffered 51200 warnings 
 
! 
 
no aaa new-model 
dot11 syslog 
 
! 
 
! 
 
ip cef 
 
! 
 
! 
 
ip domain name yourdomain.com 
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! 
 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
 
! 
 
! 
 
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-2279471600 
 enrollment selfsigned 
 subject-name 
 cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-2279471600 
 revocation-check none 
 rsakeypair TP-self-signed-2279471600 
 
! 
 
! 
 
 
! 
 
! 
 
username ccseadmin privilege 15 secret 5 $1$tmxH$w.QG5IjfyPdUf0yzrY/PV/ 
archive 
 log config 
  hidekeys 
 
! 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
interface Tunnel0 
  
ip address 172.16.13.2 255.255.255.252 
  
tunnel source Serial0/0/0 
  
tunnel destination 192.0.3.1 
 
! 
 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
  
description $ETH-LAN$$ETH-SW-LAUNCH$$INTF-INFO-FE 0/0$ 
  
ip address 10.10.10.1 255.255.255.248 
  
duplex auto 
  
speed auto 
 
! 
 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 
 no ip address 
  
shutdown 
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duplex auto 
  
speed auto 
 
! 
 
interface Serial0/0/0 
  
ip address 192.0.5.2 255.255.255.252 
  
no keepalive 
 
! 
 
interface Serial0/2/0 
 
 ip address 192.0.6.1 255.255.255.252 
 
 no keepalive 
  
clock rate 2000000 
 
! 
 
router bgp 400 
  
no synchronization 
  
bgp log-neighbor-changes 
  
redistribute connected 
  
neighbor 192.0.5.1 remote-as 300 
 
 neighbor 192.0.6.2 remote-as 400 
 
 neighbor 192.0.6.2 next-hop-self 
  
default-information originate 
 
 no auto-summary 
 
! 
 
ip forward-protocol nd 
 
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.0.5.1 
 
! 
 
! 
 
ip http server 
 
ip http access-class 23 
 
ip http authentication local 
 
ip http secure-server 
 
ip http timeout-policy idle 60 life 86400 requests 10000 
 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
 
! 
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! 
 
control-plane 
! 
banner exec                                                                           
% Password expiration warning. 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  
  
 
username <myuser> privilege 15 secret 0 <mypassword> 
  
 
Replace <myuser> and <mypassword> with the username and password you want to  
use. 
  
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                                          
 
! 
 
line con 0 
 login local 
 
line aux 0 
 
line vty 0 4 
 
 privilege level 15 
 password (($3 
 
 login 
 transport input telnet ssh 
 
line vty 5 15 
 access-class 23 in 
 privilege level 15 
 login local 
 transport input telnet ssh 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1000 
! 
end 
 
FIGURE A. 5 R4 CONFIGURATION 
 
 
! 
version 12.4 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no service password-encryption 
! 
hostname R6 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
logging buffered 51200 warnings 
! 
no aaa new-model 
dot11 syslog 
! 
! 
ip cef 
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! 
! 
ip domain name yourdomain.com 
! 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
! 
! 
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-3041265475 
 enrollment selfsigned 
 subject-name cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-3041265475 
 revocation-check none 
 rsakeypair TP-self-signed-3041265475 
! 
! 
! 
! 
username ccseadmin privilege 15 secret 5 $1$UmDm$MB4.Y4AFm.1tcwPCKi.kt1 
archive 
 log config 
  hidekeys 
!  
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
interface Loopback0 
 ip address 6.6.6.6 255.255.255.255 
! 
interface Loopback6 
 ip address 192.0.22.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
 description $ETH-LAN$$ETH-SW-LAUNCH$$INTF-INFO-FE 0/0$ 
 ip address 10.10.10.1 255.255.255.248 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface Serial0/0/0 
 ip address 192.0.10.2 255.255.255.252 
 no keepalive 
! 
interface Serial0/2/0 
 ip address 192.0.20.1 255.255.255.252 
 no keepalive 
 clock rate 128000 
! 
router bgp 600 
 no synchronization 
 bgp log-neighbor-changes 
 redistribute connected 
 neighbor 20.1.1.1 remote-as 100 
 neighbor 192.0.10.1 remote-as 300 
 neighbor 192.0.20.2 remote-as 600 
 neighbor 193.1.1.1 remote-as 100 
 no auto-summary 
! 
ip forward-protocol nd 
! 
! 
ip http server 
ip http access-class 23 
ip http authentication local 
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ip http secure-server 
ip http timeout-policy idle 60 life 86400 requests 10000 
! 
access-list 23 permit 10.10.10.0 0.0.0.7 
! 
! 
! 
! 
control-plane 
! 
banner exec                                                                           
 
username <myuser> privilege 15 secret 0 <mypassword> 
  
Replace <myuser> and <mypassword> with the username and password you want to  
use. 
  
! 
line con 0 
 login local 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
 privilege level 15 
 password (($3 
 login 
 transport input telnet ssh 
line vty 5 15 
 access-class 23 in 
 privilege level 15 
 login local 
 transport input telnet ssh 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1000 
! 
end 
 
 
FIGURE A. 6 R6 CONFIGURATION 
 
 
! 
version 12.4 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no service password-encryption 
! 
hostname R7 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
logging buffered 51200 warnings 
! 
no aaa new-model 
dot11 syslog 
! 
! 
ip cef 
! 
! 
no ip domain lookup 
ip domain name yourdomain.com 
! 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
! 
! 
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-2730237386 
 enrollment selfsigned 
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 subject-name cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-2730237386 
 revocation-check none 
 rsakeypair TP-self-signed-2730237386 
! 
! 
! 
! 
username ccseadmin privilege 15 secret 5 $1$SwoA$p08RE7R/qBa9pKZKAQ/v.1 
archive 
 log config 
  hidekeys 
!  
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
 description $ETH-LAN$$ETH-SW-LAUNCH$$INTF-INFO-FE 0/0$ 
 ip address 192.0.21.1 255.255.255.0 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface Serial0/0/0 
 ip address 192.0.20.2 255.255.255.252 
 no keepalive 
! 
router bgp 600 
 no synchronization 
 bgp log-neighbor-changes 
 redistribute connected 
 neighbor 192.0.20.1 remote-as 600 
 no auto-summary 
! 
ip forward-protocol nd 
! 
! 
ip http server 
ip http access-class 23 
ip http authentication local 
ip http secure-server 
ip http timeout-policy idle 60 life 86400 requests 10000 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
control-plane 
! 
banner exec                                                                           
 
username <myuser> privilege 15 secret 0 <mypassword> 
  
Replace <myuser> and <mypassword> with the username and password you want to  
use. 
  
! 
line con 0 
 login local 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
 access-class 23 in 
 privilege level 15 
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 password (($3 
 login 
 transport input telnet ssh 
line vty 5 15 
 access-class 23 in 
 privilege level 15 
 login local 
 transport input telnet ssh 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1000 
! 
end 
 
 
FIGURE A. 7 R7 CONFIGURATION 
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APPENDIX B  
SOLUTIONS CONFIGURATION 
COMMANDS 
 
CONFIGURING LOCAL PREFERENCE VALUE 
 
 
 
 
 
CONFIGURING WEIGHT VALUE  
R1(config)#router bgp 100 
R1(config-router)# neighbor 192.0.3.2 weight 700  
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CONFIGURING BGP MED VALUE 
 
 
 
 
CONFIGURING EBGP MULTIHOP VALUE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONFIGURING INTERFACE COUNTER RESET 
 
R1# clear interface s0/0 
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CONFIGURING BGP COMMUNITY 
 
 
 
CONFIGURING MORE SPECIFIC PREFIX 
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CONFIGURING FILTER INCOMING ADVERTISEMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
CONFIGURING FILTER OUTGOING ADVERTISEMENTS 
 
 
RATE LIMIT CONFIGURATION AND BURST RATE SETTING 
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APPENDIX C 
 JAVA SOFTWARE CODE 
package AutomatedTelnetClient; 
 
import org.apache.commons.net.telnet.TelnetClient; 
import java.io.InputStream; 
import java.io.PrintStream; 
import java.net.InetAddress; 
import java.text.DateFormat; 
import java.text.SimpleDateFormat; 
import java.util.Date; 
public class AutomatedTelnetClient { 
private TelnetClient telnet = new TelnetClient(); 
private InputStream in; 
private PrintStream out; 
private String prompt = "#"; 
private static DateFormat dateFormat7 = new SimpleDateFormat("HH:mm:ss"); 
private static DateFormat dateFormat = new SimpleDateFormat("HH:mm:ss"); 
//private static Date date = new Date(); 
//public static  String Stampdate = dateFormat.format(date); 
public AutomatedTelnetClient(String server, String user, String password) { 
try { 
// Connect to the specified server 
telnet.connect(server, 23); 
 
// Get input and output stream references 
in = telnet.getInputStream(); 
out = new PrintStream(telnet.getOutputStream()); 
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// Log the user on 
//readUntil("login: "); 
//write(user); 
readUntil("Password: "); 
write(password); 
// Advance to a prompt 
readUntil(prompt); 
write("conf t"); 
readUntil(prompt); 
//write("clear ip bgp *"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
write("inter s0/0/0"); 
readUntil(prompt); 
write("encaps ppp"); 
readUntil(prompt); 
write("ip access-group 1 in"); 
readUntil(prompt); 
//write("ip access-group 171 out"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("route-map IISP permit 10"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("set metric 90"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("set as-path prepend 100 100 100 100 100"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("route-map PREF permit 10"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("set local-preference 200"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("route-map BLOCK permit 10"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("match ip address 60"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("route-map GOOD permit 10"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("match ip address 70"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("access-list 60 permit 192.0.1.0 0.0.0.255"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("access-list 70 permit 192.0.3.0 0.0.0.252"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
write("router bgp 100"); 
readUntil(prompt); 
//write("neighbor 192.0.2.2 advertise-map BLOCK exist-map GOOD"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("bgp always-compare-med"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("bgp bestpath med missing-as-worst"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("neighbor 192.0.3.2 weight 200"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("neighbor 192.0.3.2 default-originate"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
write("neighbor 192.0.2.2 route-map IISP out");// for BOTH MED and PrePending 
readUntil(prompt); 
//write("neighbor 192.0.3.2 route-map PREF IN");// for BOTH MED and PrePending 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("bgp fast-external-fallover"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
write("exit"); 
readUntil(prompt); 
write("interface s0/0/0"); 
readUntil(prompt); 
write("no encaps ppp"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("no shut"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
write("exit"); 
readUntil(prompt); 
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write("exit"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
//write("clear ip bgp *"); 
//readUntil(prompt); 
} 
catch (Exception e) { 
e.printStackTrace(); 
} 
} 
 
public void su(String password) { 
try { 
write("admin"); 
readUntil("password: "); 
write(password); 
prompt = "admin>"; 
readUntil(prompt + " " ); 
//String s = "set"; 
write("set"); 
readUntil(prompt + " " ); 
} 
catch (Exception e) { 
e.printStackTrace(); 
} 
} 
 
public String readUntil(String pattern) { 
try { 
char lastChar = pattern.charAt(pattern.length() - 1); 
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer(); 
boolean found = false; 
char ch = (char) in.read(); 
while (true) { 
System.out.print(ch); 
sb.append(ch); 
if (ch == lastChar) { 
if (sb.toString().endsWith(pattern)) { 
return sb.toString(); 
} 
} 
ch = (char) in.read(); 
} 
} 
catch (Exception e) { 
e.printStackTrace(); 
} 
return null; 
} 
 
public void write(String value) { 
try { 
out.println(value); 
out.flush(); 
System.out.println(value); 
} 
catch (Exception e) { 
e.printStackTrace(); 
} 
} 
 
public String sendCommand(String command) { 
try { 
write(command); 
return readUntil(prompt); 
} 
catch (Exception e) { 
e.printStackTrace(); 
} 
return null; 
} 
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public void disconnect() { 
try { 
telnet.disconnect(); 
} 
catch (Exception e) { 
e.printStackTrace(); 
} 
} 
public static void main(String[] args) { 
try { 
 boolean md = true ; boolean chk = true ; 
 int i = 0; 
while(md) { 
    //long start = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
    //System.out.println(start); 
    try { 
 //Socket socket = new Socket("192.168.1.10", 7); 
         
 InetAddress address = InetAddress.getByName("192.0.2.2"); 
    long start = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
 chk = address.isReachable(3000); 
    long end = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
    System.out.println("time " + (end - start)); 
 System.out.println(chk); 
 if(chk == false){ 
    i++;} 
 System.out.println(i); 
 if(chk== false && i > 2){ 
  Date date = new Date(); 
  String Stampdate = dateFormat7.format(date); 
  System.out.println("Malicious Action Start at: " + Stampdate); 
 
  md = false;} 
 //socket.close(); 
    } catch (Exception e) { 
 System.out.println(e); 
    } 
  //  long end = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
  //  System.out.println(end);   
    
} 
// 
//  Start Forcing Our Border Router by telnet  // 
AutomatedTelnetClient telnet = new AutomatedTelnetClient("192.0.1.1","admin","(($3"); 
//System.out.println("program"); 
//telnet.sendCommand("set"); 
telnet.sendCommand("\n"); 
//telnet.sendCommand("dir"); 
 
telnet.disconnect(); 
boolean md2 = false; 
boolean chk7 = false ; 
while(md2 == false) { 
     
    try { 
     //System.out.println("program"); 
 //Socket socket = new Socket("192.168.1.10", 7); 
     //long start = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
 InetAddress address = InetAddress.getByName("192.0.21.23"); 
 chk7 = address.isReachable(3000); 
    //long end = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
 if(chk7 == true){ 
 Date date7 = new Date(); 
 String Stampdate7 = dateFormat7.format(date7); 
 System.out.println("Good Action Start at: " + Stampdate7); 
  md2 = true;} 
 //socket.close(); 
    } catch (Exception e) { 
 System.out.println(e); 
    } 
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  //  System.out.println(md);   
    //System.out.println("time " + (end - start)); 
} 
System.out.println("\n"); 
//double s = Stampdate7. - Stampdate; 
//System.out.println("TIME: " + s); 
} 
catch (Exception e) { 
e.printStackTrace(); 
} 
} 
} 
FIGURE C. 1 CHECKER SOFTWARE JAVA CODE 
 
APPENDIX D  
TRACE ROUTE RESULTS 
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FIGURE D. 1 TRACE ROUTE OVER IDENTICAL SCENARIO 
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FIGURE D. 2 TRACE ROUTE OVER NON-IDENTICAL SCENARIO 
AS-PATH SHORTENING METHOD 
 
FIGURE D. 3 TRACEROUTE RESULTS FOR AS-PATH SHORTENING METHOD OVER IDENTICAL 
SCENARIO 
 
Figure D.3 shows the traceroute result from the FTP server in AS600 to a workstation in 
AS100 after testing this method in the identical scenario. The results demonstrate that the 
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tracing packets have gone through the good IISP (192.0.3.2) after implementing this 
method. Figure D.1 illustrates how the trace route packets traverse over the identical 
scenario from a workstation resides in AS100 to the server in AS600. 
MORE SPECIFIC METHOD 
 
FIGURE D. 4 TRACEROUTE RESULTS FOR MORE SPECIFIC METHOD OVER THE NON-
IDENTICAL SCENARIO 
 
Figure D.4 shows the traceroute results of testing this method in the non-identical 
scenario. The results demonstrate that the tracing packets have gone through the good 
IISP (192.0.3.2) after implementing this method. Figure D.2 illustrates how the trace route 
packets traverse over the non-identical scenario from a workstation resides in AS100 to 
the server in AS600. 
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BGP COMMUNITY METHOD 
 
FIGURE D. 5 TRACEROUTE RESULTS FOR BGP COMMUNITY METHOD OVER NON-IDENTICAL 
SCENARIO. 
Figure D.5 shows the traceroute results of testing this method in the non-identical 
scenario. The results demonstrate that the tracing packets have gone through the good 
IISP (192.0.3.2) after implementing this method. Figure D.2 illustrates how the trace route 
packets traverse over the non-identical scenario from a workstation resides in AS100 to 
the server in AS600. 
INTERFACE COUNTER RESET METHOD 
 
FIGURE D. 6 TRACEROUTE RESULTS FOR INTERFACE COUNTER RESET 
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Figure D.6 shows the traceroute result from the FTP server in AS600 to a workstation in 
AS100 after testing this method in the identical scenario. The results demonstrate that the 
tracing packets have gone through the good IISP (192.0.3.2) after implementing this 
method. Figure D.1 illustrates how the trace route packets traverse over the identical 
scenario from a workstation resides in AS100 to the server in AS600. 
IP STATIC/DEFAULT METHOD 
 
FIGURE D. 7 TRACEROUTE RESULTS FOR IP STATIC/DEFAULT 
 
Figure D.7 shows the traceroute results of testing this method in the non-identical 
scenario. The results demonstrate that the tracing packets have gone through the good 
IISP (192.0.3.2) after implementing this method. Figure D.2 illustrates how the trace route 
packets traverse over the non-identical scenario from a workstation resides in AS100 to 
the server in AS600. 
  
123 
 
FILTER ADVERTISEMENTS METHOD 
 
FIGURE D. 8 TRACEROUTE RESULTS FOR FILTER ADVERTISEMENTS  
 
Figure D.8 shows the traceroute results of testing this method in the non-identical 
scenario. The results demonstrate that the tracing packets have gone through the good 
IISP (192.0.3.2) after implementing this method. Figure D.2 illustrates how the trace route 
packets traverse over the non-identical scenario from a workstation resides in AS100 to 
the server in AS600. 
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